Austrian Neutrality: Setting the Agenda by Ankenman, Kristine Sue
econstor
www.econstor.eu
Der Open-Access-Publikationsserver der ZBW – Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
The Open Access Publication Server of the ZBW – Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Die ZBW räumt Ihnen als Nutzerin/Nutzer das unentgeltliche,
räumlich unbeschränkte und zeitlich auf die Dauer des Schutzrechts
beschränkte einfache Recht ein, das ausgewählte Werk im Rahmen
der unter
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
nachzulesenden vollständigen Nutzungsbedingungen zu
vervielfältigen, mit denen die Nutzerin/der Nutzer sich durch die
erste Nutzung einverstanden erklärt.
Terms of use:
The ZBW grants you, the user, the non-exclusive right to use
the selected work free of charge, territorially unrestricted and
within the time limit of the term of the property rights according
to the terms specified at
→  http://www.econstor.eu/dspace/Nutzungsbedingungen
By the first use of the selected work the user agrees and
declares to comply with these terms of use.
zbw
Leibniz-Informationszentrum Wirtschaft
Leibniz Information Centre for Economics
Ankenman, Kristine Sue
Working Paper
Austrian Neutrality: Setting the Agenda
Wismarer Diskussionspapiere, No. 13/2006
Provided in cooperation with:
Hochschule Wismar
Suggested citation: Ankenman, Kristine Sue (2006) : Austrian Neutrality: Setting the Agenda,





















Heft 13 / 2006 
 
W DP
Wismarer Diskussionspapiere / Wismar Discussion PapersDer Fachbereich Wirtschaft der Hochschule Wismar, University of Technology, Busi-
ness and Design bietet die Präsenzstudiengänge Betriebswirtschaft, Management so-
zialer Dienstleistungen, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht sowie die Fernstu-
diengänge Betriebswirtschaft, International Management, Krankenhaus-Management 
und Wirtschaftsinformatik an. Gegenstand der Ausbildung sind die verschiedenen As-
pekte des Wirtschaftens in der Unternehmung, der modernen Verwaltungstätigkeit im 
sozialen Bereich, der Verbindung von angewandter Informatik und Wirtschaftswissen-
schaften sowie des Rechts im Bereich der Wirtschaft.  
Nähere Informationen zu Studienangebot, Forschung und Ansprechpartnern finden Sie 
auf unserer Homepage im World Wide Web (WWW): http://www.wi.hs-wismar.de/. 
Die Wismarer Diskussionspapiere/Wismar Discussion Papers sind urheberrechtlich 
geschützt. Eine Vervielfältigung ganz oder in Teilen, ihre Speicherung sowie jede Form 
der Weiterverbreitung bedürfen der vorherigen Genehmigung durch den Herausgeber. 
 
Herausgeber:  Prof. Dr. Jost W. Kramer 
 Fachbereich  Wirtschaft 
 Hochschule  Wismar 
University of Technology, Business and Design 
 Philipp-Müller-Straße 
  Postfach 12 10 
  D – 23966 Wismar 
  Telefon: ++49/(0)3841/753 441 
  Fax: ++49/(0)3841/753 131 
 e-mail:  j.kramer@wi.hs-wismar.de 
Vertrieb:  HWS-Hochschule Wismar Service GmbH 
 Phillipp-Müller-Straße 
  Postfach 12 10  
 23952  Wismar 
 Telefon:++49/(0)3841/753-574 
  Fax: ++49/(0) 3841/753-575 
 e-mail:  info@hws-wismar.de 





JEL-Klassifikation N44, Z00, Z13 
 
Alle Rechte vorbehalten. 
 
© Hochschule Wismar, Fachbereich Wirtschaft, 2006. 







I. Abstract  8 
 
II. Introduction  8 
 
III. Modeling Kingdon  11 
A. Why  Kingdon?  11 
B. Explaining  Kingdon  13 
1.  The Problem Stream  15 
2.  The Policy Stream  17 
3.  The Political Stream  19 
4. Coupling  and  Windows  21 
 
IV. Historical Context of Austrian Neutrality  23 
A. Why  Austria?  23 
B. Explaining  Austria  25 
1.  Historical Context of Neutrality Policy & Law  25 
a) Cold  War  (1945-1989)  25 
(1) Constructing Identity  26 
(2) Kreisky Era (1970-1983)  33 
b) “Re-contextualization”  37 
(1) EU Membership: A Window of Opportunity  38 
(2) The “Fallout” & “Spillover”  41 
2.  Changes to the Security Environment: Setting the Agenda  44 
 
V.  Neutrality and the Governmental Agenda  52 
A.  The Problem Stream: Identifying the Problem  54 
1.  Focusing Events, Crises, and Symbols  56 
2. Feedback  59 
B.  The Policy Stream: Policy, Alternatives & Entrepreneurs  61 
1.  Policy Community & Proposals  61 
2. Viable  Alternatives  63 
C.  The Political Stream: Political Events  65   4 
1. National  Mood  66 
2. Pressure  Groups  70 
3. Election  Results  74 
D.  Coupling & the Policy Window  78 
 
VI. Summary & Conclusion  83 
 
 
Works Cited  86 
 
 
On the Author  96 
   5
Preface 
Broadening one’s horizon is probably the most fascinating opportunity offered 
by universities to their students. Therefore, lectures, seminars, and projects 
should not only focus on transfer of knowledge, but also offer incentives for 
(self-)education. If this comes to happen, “broadening one’s horizon” may 
well be taken literally: A political science and economics major from the 
Northwest of Germany being shipped to the University of Nebraska in Lincoln 
or a postgraduate student of German studies from Grand Island, Nebraska be-
ing transferred from the University of New Mexico in Albuquerque being 
transferred to Graz University in Austria. 
Such experiences will not only have a lasting effect on the individual in 
question, but can also lead them to choose a research topic, where interdisci-
plinary methods and intercultural perspectives can be brought together. At its 
worst, such an attempt ends as a dubious mixture, neither flesh nor bone. At its 
best, a new perspective is applied and new insights are to be gained – as is 
shown in this paper. 
During her studies in Austria, Kristine Sue Ankenman became interested in 
the strongly disputed concept of Austrian neutrality and as a researcher with a 
broad background in political science as well as in German studies she started 
to wonder, why there was so much discussion going on and so little formal 
change seemed to happen. Looking for an explanation for such a non-
development, she became familiar with Kingdon’s model of policy windows. 
Using Kingdon’s concept as an analytical instrument, Ankenman, a former 
colleague from the University of Nebraska, was able to explain, why neutrality 
has been discussed for a long time, how it has been changed and re-
contextualized, and why it will continue to exist. 
In the fall of 2005, her research has been accepted as a master thesis in 
German Studies at the University of Mexico. I am honoured to accept this pa-
per from Kristine Sue Ankenman for publication in this series – an American 
researcher’s explanation for Austrian political issues. 
 
Wismar, June 2006 
 
 
Jost W. Kramer 
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I. Abstract 
By the time Austria prepared to join the European Union on Jan. 1, 1995, neu-
trality law and policy had been adapted, modified, and “re-contextualized” to 
the point where many policy experts maintained, that it existed only as a law 
on paper. Yet public opinion is still overwhelming in ￿avour of continued 
neutrality. This dissonance between public perceptions and governmental 
￿avourtives came to a head in 2005, when amidst constitutional reform; the 
Austrian constitutional convention uncovered a conflict between the Neu-
tralitätsgesetz and BV-G BGBl Art. 23f.  
While conditions in 2005 initially appeared to ￿avour change to constitu-
tional neutrality, this did not happen. Many experts attribute the lack of sub-
stantial change to overwhelming public support for neutrality. However, with 
the use of Kingdon’s model of agenda setting, as outlined in the ninth edition 
of Agendas, Alternatives and Public Policy, I will demonstrate how neutrality 
has become less an issue of national identity and more of a domestic, political 
tool for maintaining the balance-of-power between the Austrian political par-
ties since the fall of the two-party system in the 1980s.  
After a brief overview of Kingdon’s policy model, I review the historical 
context of neutrality including its Cold War context, its role in the construc-
tion of national identity, and for the “re-contextualization” of security and de-
fense in the 1990s.  
In addition to shedding new light on the dichotomy between constitutional 
neutrality and the requirements of the European Union’s Common Foreign 
and Security Policy, the following analysis shows how neutrality is still not 
considered a problem, but a solution to EU domination over national interests. 
It also shows how the EU’s proposed Constitution has failed to provide a vi-
able policy alternative to neutrality. Finally, this analysis shows that while the 
Austrian people still overwhelmingly support neutrality, it is actually the po-
litical parties, who continue to value neutrality as a political tool for maintain-
ing domestic, political stability as Austria transitions from a two-party conso-
ciational democracy to a western-style, multi-party democracy.  
VI.  Introduction 
In the year 2005, Austria celebrated various anniversaries marking the estab-
lishment and achievements of the Second Republic. Ironically, 2005 also saw 
the Austrian government make sweeping changes to the very constitution it 
celebrated. This included the potential repeal of constitutional neutrality in the 
face of continued European integration and the ratification of the European 
Constitutional Treaty in May 2005. Inherent in debates on Austria’s role 
within the new European order has been the ongoing problem of reconciling   9
constitutional neutrality with membership in a European Security and Defense 
structure. 
Historically, neutrality has proven a very successful policy instrument per-
mitting Austria to emerge from the rubble of World War II and avoid the costs 
associated with maintaining a large, standing army. It also permitted the con-
struction of a uniquely “Austrian” national identity removed from the “pan-
Germanic” one that had previously marked the outbreak of two world wars, 
while still promoting an international image of stability, prosperity, and moral 
superiority. This, however, changed in the mid-1980s, when globalization and 
economic pressures forced Austrian business and industry to demand member-
ship in the European Union. Up until then, classical or traditional definitions 
of neutrality, as established by the Hague Conventions of 1907, had largely 
gone unchallenged. Yet even before it established itself as a permanently neu-
tral country on October 26, 1955, Austria had already set out to define neutral-
ity on its own terms quickly deviating from the Swiss model, which failed to 
take into account Austria’s unique circumstances
1. With each new challenge to 
its foreign policy stance, Austria managed to re-interpret neutrality to its ad-
vantage without rejecting the basic tenants of classical neutrality. By the time 
Austria prepared to join the European Union on January 1, 1995, neutrality 
law and policy had been adapted, modified, “re-contextualized”, “re-
conceptualized”, and generally altered to the point where policy experts could 
argue that the federal government had deviated so far from the original context 
of Austrian neutrality as to render even constitutional neutrality meaningless.  
It is believed that when Austria joined the European Union, the Austrian 
SPÖ-ÖVP coalition government not only relinquished total control over for-
eign policy; but also, committed the country to an as yet undefined military 
pact. Policy experts could now argue that Austria’s commitment to a regional 
military union, as proposed in the European Union’s Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP), was in direct conflict with constitutional neutrality 
[B-VG BGBl. 1955/211] and that it could only be a matter of time, before neu-
trality was formally repealed. By 2005, it seemed the potential for change 
might actually exist as a right-far right coalition, already considered an out-
spoken opponent of neutrality and a proponent of NATO membership, began 
revising the Austrian federal constitution amid ratification of the proposed 
Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. It was feared that the ÖVP-FPÖ 
government had been given the opportunity to repeal constitutional neutrality; 
yet, this did not happen.  
The popular reason given for continued neutrality is that the Austrian peo-
                                           
1   Austria insisted during final negotiations of the State Treaty, that it be allowed to join 
the United Nations, and that neutrality was compatible with membership in that organi-
zation, something Switzerland rejected. On 14 Dec 1955, Austria became a full member 
of the UN.    10 
ple have come to associate neutrality with national identity and no government 
would risk voter backlash. The dissonance between public and governmental 
perceptions of neutrality policy has been well documented by numerous Aus-
trian policy experts, as has the link between neutrality and national identity. It 
is not within the scope of this paper to revisit these topics; however, building 
on the premise that neutrality is closely linked to Austrian identity and that 
public perceptions of neutrality are not concurrent with governmental 
￿avourtives, it is possible to demonstrate with the use of a valid policy model 
that overwhelming popular mood is not alone responsible for continued neu-
trality in Austria. In fact, with the use of John W. Kingdon’s policy model, as 
outlined in the ninth edition of Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policy, I will 
demonstrate that neutrality has become less an issue of national identity and 
more a political tool for maintaining a balance of power between the political 
parties since the fall of the two-party system in the new multi-party system.  
Evidence of this assertion can be found as far back as 1955, at the time neu-
trality was established to “stabilize” the new democracy and most recently in 
1995, when the SPÖ-ÖVP coalition, or Social Partners, managed to persuade 
the Austrian people to vote for EU membership despite the apparent 
￿avour￿￿r￿tions to neutrality (Lantis/Queen). Lantis/Queen have demon-
strated the successful use of a double-edge diplomacy model which showed 
how the Austrian coalition government (Social Partnership of the SPÖ and 
ÖVP), when they presented a united front, were able to persuade the EU to 
grant membership to a neutral nation in exchange for concessions and prom-
ises to repeal neutrality at a future date; while at the same time persuading the 
Austrian people that neutrality could be made compatible with membership in 
a supranational union – even with military pretensions. It is ultimately, how-
ever, the events of late 2004 and 2005, which have demonstrated that neutral-
ity has come full circle and remains an important political tool, used by the 
Austrian political elite to control domestic political events.  
Much like the problem-solving processes in the business world, Kingdon’s 
model identifies three process streams, which at their most simplistic include 
the processes of accurately identifying a problem, finding the best solution, 
and promoting both to a receptive group of people who are able to effect 
change. Assuming all of these processes are in place at the right time, change 
will occur. In the case of Kingdon’s model, these have translated into a prob-
lem stream, a policy stream, and a political stream which when conditions are 
right will open a policy window or “window of opportunity” in which the po-
tential for change is at its greatest. By analyzing neutrality within the context 
of this model, I have been able to show that neutrality has never really been 
identified as a policy problem and that no viable alternatives to neutrality ex-
ist.  
The failure of neutrality to make it onto the governmental agenda has   11
widely been attributed to the overwhelming popularity of neutrality among the 
Austrian people; however, public mood or opinion alone cannot account for 
the continued success of neutrality. As Kingdon’s model will demonstrate, it is 
not necessarily the Austrian people who are the defenders of neutrality, but the 
Austrian political parties, which consider neutrality a powerful political tool, 
which have prevented any real change to constitutional neutrality.  
In analyzing the findings from Kingdon’s model, it becomes apparent that 
neutrality continues to ￿avour the purpose for which it was created. It was 
designed in 1955 to prevent political instability in Austria, assuming that this 
in turn would prevent future wars in Europe – and that is exactly 
what neutrality continues to do today, especially as Austria evolves back into a 
true multi-party democracy. Neutrality is proving to be a form of “checks and 
balances” on the present political parties and their ruling political elite – rein-
forcing and gradually replacing the artificial system of consociational democ-
racy that for decades worked under the two-party system of the SPÖ-ÖVP So-
cial Partnership, but has begun to erode as Austria has developed into a multi-
party system and the far-right, “nationalist” elements have begun to re-emerge.  
Austria is of particular interest because of the unique circumstances 
￿avour￿ing the origin and development of perpetual, constitutional neutrality 
and the current dichotomy between Austrian law and policy. In an effort to 
better understand the dynamics of neutrality in its present context, as well as 
the events, people, and processes, which are presently shaping the course of 
neutrality policy, it is first necessary to understand Kingdon’s model of agen-
da setting, which will be covered in section II. In section III, the historical 
context in which Austrian neutrality policy was conceived and developed, up 
to and including the present relationship to the European Union’s security and 
defense options, will provide the basis for my argument in section IV that neu-
trality has since 1955 been a political tool to control the Austrian people; but, 
as Austria has evolved from a two-party consociational democracy into a true, 
democratic, multi-party political system in the 1990s, neutrality became a po-
litical tool for the various political parties to reduce conflict and instability.  
In a final analysis of neutrality and the Austrian governmental agenda, in 
section V, I will demonstrate with the help of Kingdon’s model how neutrality 
is still a very necessary and valid policy process for Austria, even if public 
mood were not acting as a constraint on the political process, if only to help 
Austria continue the transition process to a true, multi-party democracy. 
III. Modeling  Kingdon 
A. Why  Kingdon? 
I have chosen Kingdon’s model for its unique applicability to public policy 
formation. Not only is it a well-developed policy model incorporating aspects   12 
of how issues become problems and gain prominence on a national agenda, 
but it is also applicable to the study of policy formation in other countries 
where the decision making process is not concentrated in the hands of one in-
dividual or select group.  
Kingdon’s research was designed to follow public policy formation over 
time, allowing for the interaction of various process “streams” which affect the 
setting of governmental agendas. He based his research on years of interviews, 
case studies, data, and observation of agenda and policy processes involved in 
the creation of U.S. health and transportation policy during the 1970s and 
1980s. Using a modified version of the Cohen-March-Olsen “garbage can” 
model of public policy formation, he proposed three process streams that gen-
erally flow independently of one another until such a time as elements in all 
three converge and a policy window or “window of opportunity” opens (83-
84).  
Kingdon’s model focuses mainly on the “pre-decision process” of how is-
sues or problems get onto the governmental agenda, rather than the “decision” 
process of a formal vote or final decision. In chapter one, he outlines his moti-
vation for studying agenda setting by noting Victor Hugo’s phrase, “an idea 
whose time has come” (Kingdon 1); and, by suggesting that the phenomena 
behind the rise and fall of such ideas or “issues” are not as random as many 
think. They can be recognized by such things as “sustained and marked 
changes in public opinion, repeated mobilization of people with intensely held 
preferences, and bandwagons onto which politicians of all persuasions climb” 
(1). He goes on to point out that, “The patterns of public policy, after all, are 
determined not only by such final decisions as votes in legislatures, or initia-
tives and vetoes by presidents, but also by the fact that some subjects and pro-
posals emerge in the first place and others are never seriously considered” (2). 
His model finds patterns and elements of predictability within the chaos that is 
public policy formation. By using Kingdon’s model of agenda setting, one can 
ascertain which actors and events have elevated neutrality to a problem, forc-
ing it onto the governmental agenda, and into public awareness. Kingdon’s 
model will also help to make sense of the policy community or “policy prime-
val soup” and its processes, which include generating policy proposals and 
potential alternatives. Lastly, we will look at those political events and condi-
tions, including public mood/opinion, election results, and government turn-
over, which have recently affected neutrality policy. 
Although Kingdon’s model was developed while studying United States 
government and policy, it can easily be applied to the study of Austrian neu-
trality with minor modifications to allow for differences in political structure: 
the most obvious difference being at the executive level, where in Austria 
power is not concentrated in the hands of a single leader; but, divided between 
the federal government (federal chancellor and ministers) and the federal   13
president. While such differences are not important to the final analysis of a 
potential policy window, they are significant to the understanding of the con-
ditions within each process stream. 
I wish to add one final important note before entering into an overview of 
Kingdon’s model of agenda setting. It must be remembered that for Kingdon, 
why policy change fails is nearly as important as why it succeeds. This point 
will prove critical in the following analysis of Austrian neutrality policy.  
B. Explaining  Kingdon 
Although Kingdon’s model of agenda setting at first seems quite complex, 
there are discernable elements which can be highlighted and used as the start-
ing point for any analysis of neutrality policy. The key to understanding King-
don’s model is to remember that it focuses on the “pre-decision” processes of 
agenda setting and alternative specification rather than the actual “decision” 
processes of making an authoritative choice and implementation of the policy, 
i.e. a formal, legislative vote (2-3). It is also important to keep in mind that 
Kingdon differentiates between three types of agendas: specialized, govern-
mental, and decision.  Specialized agendas are created primarily within the 
various government agencies (or in Austria’s case, ministries) and they seldom 
garner attention outside of the governmental agencies that develop them (3). 
Our attention, for the purpose of this study, will be directed towards the gov-
ernmental agenda, which Kingdon defines as “the list of subjects or problems 
to which governmental officials, and people outside of government closely 
associated with those officials, are paying some serious attention at any given 
time” (3). Assuming a subject rises high enough on the governmental agenda, 
it will often move to a decision agenda for an “active decision”, usually in the 
form of a vote or executive order (Kingdon 4).  
Kingdon also distinguishes between the agenda and alternatives noting that 
once an issue or problem makes it onto the governmental agenda, a solution 
must be found from within a set of available alternatives in order for the prob-
lem to stay on the agenda (4). If no viable solution exists at the time a problem 
rises onto the agenda, the problem will in all likelihood be tabled in ￿avour of 
more pressing issues or ignored entirely until it either goes away or a solution 
is eventually found. Armed with these definitions, it is now possible to explain 
Kingdon’s model of agenda setting in greater detail. 
Kingdon has identified two important “factors” that “might affect agenda 
setting and the specification of alternatives: the participants who are active, 
and the processes by which agenda items and alternatives come into promi-
nence” (15). The interaction of these two factors, participants and processes, 
determines whether an issue even gets on the agenda; but also whether it stays 
on the agenda and what importance is attached to the issue. The interplay of 
participants and processes lead to the rise and fall of issues on the agenda.   14 
While Kingdon is careful to categorize the various participants throughout 
the processes, he gives special notice to what he calls “policy entrepreneurs” 
(122-124,179-183, 204). These are individuals who not only have a special 
interest above and beyond other participants in these processes; but who are 
also willing to invest their resources to see their pet problem or solution be-
come policy. They are largely distinguished from mere participants by their 
level of commitment to the agenda item.  
Kingdon has categorized participants based mainly on two sets of criteria: 
level of authority and visibility. Participants or “players” can be both “inside” 
and “outside” of government, distinguished largely by whether or not they 
have formal or informal authority over policy (45). Formal authority is con-
sidered to be imparted through either an electoral mandate or presidential ap-
pointment; whereas, informal authority is generally reserved for 
￿avour￿￿r￿fy￿ties, presidential staff, and high-level advisers. Participants 
are also categorized by the level of media and public attention they receive. 
“Visible” and “hidden” clusters of participants are important to understanding 
the agenda process when one considers the amount of public attention they 
receive (68). Kingdon’s research has shown that a visible insider like the 
president of the United States has more power over setting the governmental 
agenda than an undersecretary or presidential staffer (inside, hidden) or a local 
radio station (outside). In the final analysis it can be concluded that in general, 
the closer one is to the center of power and the more visibility one has, the 
greater the ability to affect the governmental agenda (Kingdon 68-70).  
Participants alone, however, do not set the agenda. Kingdon has identified 
three processes, which are also important to agenda setting: problem recogni-
tion, generating policy proposals from available alternatives and political 
events or conditions (87). While his model is relatively complex, these three 
processes can be outlined in a simple diagram (see Fig. 1.) based on King-
don’s own summary: “We conceive of three process streams flowing through 
the system – streams of problems, policies, and politics. They are largely in-
dependent of one another and each develops according to its own dynamics 
and rules. But at some critical junctures the three streams are joined, and the 
greatest policy changes grow out of that coupling of problems, policy propos-
als, and politics” (19). Figure 1 provides a visual overview of Kingdon’s pol-
icy model.  
Kingdon has adapted the general concept of identifying a problem, finding a 
solution, and building consensus for proposed change to the political envi-
ronment, having identified various mechanisms and sub-processes specific to 
politics and policymaking. In Kingdon’s processes, the presence or absence of 
these mechanisms and sub-processes, help determine whether the criteria for 
the individual process stream have been met.   15
Figure 1: Simplification of Kingdon’s process model  
 
Source:  Simplification of Kingdon’s process model based on Kingdon (1995: 19). 
The process streams, which Kingdon proposes in his model, are fluid, com-
plex, and rely heavily on policy entrepreneurs to bring them together in order 
for a window to open (182). While it is not within the scope of this paper to 
cover in great detail all of the intricacies of the three process streams, it is nec-
essary to provide a cursory overview of each along with a summary of how 
they “couple” to form a policy window. 
VI.  The Problem Stream 
The first process stream, which Kingdon identifies, is the problem stream. The 
difference between a “problem” and a “condition” is often one of perception. 
“Conditions become defined as problems when we come to believe that we 
should do something about them” (Kingdon 109). Identifying whether or not 
neutrality is recognized as a problem will be the first step in applying King-
don’s model to Austria’s condition. Kingdon suggests several ways in which 
conditions become problems in Chapter 5 of Agenda, Alternatives, and Public 
Policy. In summary, these are [systemic] “indicators”, “focusing events”, such 
as crises, disasters, and symbols; and, “feedback”. Kingdon notes that those in 
and around government are constantly dealing with a myriad of problems and 
that some problems tend to receive more attention than others do. How some 
problems are chosen for attention over others tends to be dominated by the 
occurrence of indicators, focusing events, and feedback in combination or   16 
alone (90).  
Statistical or quantitative in nature, systemic indicators are often tracked 
over long periods of time, rely on accurate methodology, and the interpretation 
of data by experts; however, they are still considered powerful measurements 
of a problem (Kingdon 90-91, 93). Examples of systemic indicators include 
the increase in number of road accidents at a certain intersection, increasing 
budget deficit in a school district or decline of individuals covered by private 
health insurance. Kingdon notes that there are three qualities to indicators that 
often make indicators hard to ignore: They are pervasive, necessary, and pow-
erful (93).  
Even if indicators are present, they alone do not always have the power to 
push a problem onto the agenda. Often, they require or are reinforced by a fo-
cusing event, such as a crisis or disaster before sufficient attention is paid to a 
problem (94). In some policy arenas, a condition is not generally considered a 
problem unless there is a crisis or disaster to garner sufficient attention (95-
96). Although a crisis may push a problem onto the agenda, it does not neces-
sarily guarantee that the problem will stay there. In these cases, crises or disas-
ters are often reinforced by the experiences of policy makers and/or the power 
of symbols (96). A recent example of a focusing event is the terrorist attack on 
the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001. The twin towers became a 
symbol for not only the U.S. but also the rest of the world, symbolizing every-
thing from an attack on democracy to the fall of imperialist capitalism. Focus-
ing events almost always need to be accompanied by some other problem 
process (98). In general, focusing events can strengthen an existing perception 
of a problem, can forewarn of an even greater problem, or taken in 
￿avour￿￿tion with a series of similar or related crises they can affect how 
the problem is defined (Kingdon 98). In addition to focusing events and indi-
cators, feedback is another method in which problems gain prominence on the 
agenda (100)  
Feedback, or the response to the operation of existing programs, is the third 
way in which problems come to the attention of government. Is the program 
working as planned? Are there unanticipated consequences or side effects? 
Kingdon identifies four ways in which feedback brings problems to the atten-
tion of government: feedback on implementation, failure to meet goals, cost, 
and unanticipated negative consequences (102-103).  
Although feedback can come from diverse sources, including the general 
public through complaints, town meetings or organized groups, feedback from 
bureaucrats tasked with administering the program through casework, sys-
temic monitoring or general perceptions tends to carry more weight, both in 
promoting a problem up the agenda or preventing it from getting serious atten-
tion (101).  
Sometimes, despite the appearance of indicators, focusing events, and feed-  17
back, a problem will still “fade” off the agenda (103). Why issues or problems 
fail is as important to Kingdon’s model as why they succeed. According to 
Kingdon, problems fall from the agenda because it is believed that they are 
solved, those in government lose interest, there is a lack of viable proposals or 
alternatives, the item is too large or requires too much effort, the short atten-
tion span of the public or “fads”; or, finally, because there is a lack of neces-
sary resources (103-105).  
Conversely, how one defines a problem can determine if a “condition” be-
comes a “problem” in the first place. Kingdon notes that, “The problem defini-
tion and struggles over definition turn out to have important consequences” 
(110). The value one places on a condition or problem determines how prob-
lems get defined (110). When dealing with values, Kingdon notes that percep-
tions between an ideal and reality or “observed conditions” often lead to a per-
ceived problem (110). As does any discrepancy in a comparison, such as the 
comparison of health care systems between two nations (111). Our tendency to 
categorize or classify things in order to find similarities and differences, how-
ever, can also lead to difficulties in defining problems. “The emergence of a 
new category is a signal public policy event. When people start thinking of 
transportation or energy, for instance instead of their separate components 
classified into other categories, entirely new definitions of problems and con-
ceptualizations of solutions come into play” (113).  
The process of identifying a problem accurately does not insure that the 
problem will receive the necessary attention to elevate it onto the agenda; but 
the appearance of one or more supporting events like indicators, focusing 
events, and feedback increase the likelihood that it will. The probability in-
creases when a problem is linked to a policy proposal (115).  
VI.  The Policy Stream 
The second process stream, which Kingdon proposes is the policy stream. In 
chapter 6, he equates the process of policy generation with the biological 
process of natural selection, even going so far as to call it a “policy primordial 
soup” (116). Nascent ideas are floated around in the right mixture of research 
and intellectual debate, eventually congealing into recognizable forms and a 
formal policy proposal. Still, Kingdon finds key elements to the process of 
policy formation, which again affect how a problem rises or falls on the 
agenda. These include a community of specialists or “policy community”, 
ways in which ideas are exchanged, a period of “softening up” the policy 
community, a set of criteria for the survival of an idea, and the presence of an 
available alternative (117).  
The policy community, as Kingdon conceives of it, is a community of spe-
cialists or experts, such as researchers, governmental support staff, academics, 
and interest group analysts who are largely responsible for the development of   18 
ideas from which policy and alternatives are eventually taken (116). “This 
community of specialists hums along on its own, independent of such political 
events as changes in administration and pressure from legislators’ 
￿avour￿￿r￿fcies (Kingdon 117). Kingdon allows that political events do 
affect the policy community, but not in the ways that they affect the political 
stream (118). The differences between the policy and political streams will be 
addressed later in the analysis of the political stream. For now, it is important 
to understand the dynamics of the policy stream as well as the impact of the 
policy stream on the problem stream.  
Central to the policy stream is the policy community and level of fragmen-
tation within the community. This means not only level and type of contact or 
interaction; but, also the ways in which information is exchanged and the fo-
cus on a common goal. In communities where specialists deal with the same 
problems, there tends to be less fragmentation; whereas, in communities where 
a division of labor or compartmentalization of competencies exist, there will 
be greater fragmentation. The consequences of community fragmentation is 
“…disjointed policy, lack of common orientation, and agenda instability” 
(143); and, the effect on the policy stream is a lack of viable policy alterna-
tives (121). It is, therefore, extremely important to the setting of the agenda 
that a cohesive community and a common paradigm exist within the policy 
stream in order for an alternative to be available at the right time. 
Key to the policy stream is the appearance of policy entrepreneurs. “These 
entrepreneurs are not necessarily found in any one location in the policy com-
munity. They could be in or out of government, in elected or appointed 
positions, in interest groups or research organizations. But their defining char-
acteristic, much as in the case of a business entrepreneur, is their willingness 
to invest their resources – time, energy, reputation, and sometimes money – in 
the hope of a future return” (Kingdon 122). Whether for personal or altruistic 
reasons, policy entrepreneurs are critical to the coupling of policy and problem 
(179). They are also important in the process of softening up both the policy 
community and the general public; a process considered “…necessary before a 
proposal is taken seriously” (143, 130).  
Ultimately, policies proposed within a policy community have to meet cer-
tain “criteria” in order to survive (131). This includes technical feasibility, 
compatibility with the values of specialists and the anticipation of future con-
straints (131-139). Assuming these criteria are met, those alternatives that sur-
vive the selection process are ready for consideration by policy makers (139). 
“The policy stream thus produces a short list of proposals. This short list is not 
necessarily a consensus in the policy community on the one proposal that 
meets their criteria; rather, it is an agreement that a few proposals are promi-
nent” (144). Thus, the policy stream includes a policy community responsible 
for producing not only policy options, but also individuals or entrepreneurs to   19
promote one or more of those options.  
Although having viable alternatives and policy entrepreneurs available 
when a problem comes along does not guarantee it will make it onto the a-
genda, it does increase the probability that it will place high on not only the 
governmental agenda, but also the decision agenda (144). 
VI.  The Political Stream 
With this in mind, we can next turn our attention to Kingdon’s final process 
stream – the political stream. Factors such as the national mood, organized 
political forces, and the role of government, including turnover of key person-
nel, election results, and questions of jurisdiction, dominate this stream (162-
163). Kingdon notes that, the political stream has a significant impact on set-
ting the agenda (145). This is especially seen whenever there is a change in 
administration where new elected officials bring with them different values 
and objectives or whenever there is strongly organized and vocal opposition to 
a proposal.  
Events within the government itself have a strong influence on the promo-
tion or demotion of items on the agenda (163). In addition to changes in politi-
cal and administrative leadership, there is also the issue of bureaucratic “turf” 
or “jurisdiction” (155). Kingdon’s research has shown that such disputes over 
competencies and territory generally inhibit a problem or solution from receiv-
ing government attention (156). An example of this is the failure to address a 
problem or provide a solution because they are perceived to be outside the 
agency’s jurisdiction (158). The exception to this, Kingdon notes, is when 
there is a bureaucratic “stalemate” which results from competition between 
departments or agencies. In these instances, issues tend to be promoted up the 
agenda (157). Still the promotion or demotion of an item on the agenda rests 
largely with perceptions of popular mood.  
“People in and around government sense a national mood. They are com-
fortable discussing its content, and believe that they know when the mood 
shifts. The idea goes by different names – the national mood, the climate in the 
country, changes in public opinion, or broad social movements. But common 
to all of these labels is the notion that a rather large number of people out in 
the country are thinking along certain common lines that this national mood 
changes from one time to another in discernable ways, and that these changes 
in mood or climate have important impacts on policy agendas and policy out-
comes” (Kingdon 146). Kingdon concedes that diagnosing public mood is an 
inexact science. Still, those who follow such tendencies closely, i.e. research-
ers of public opinion (147), can generally recognize it. Mail, town meetings, 
visits by delegates and opinion polls are used to help gauge what the popula-
tion is thinking or feeling. 
Once again, the perceptions of those in and around government are impor-  20 
tant in reading public mood. If perceptions suggest the majority of the con-
stituency is against a policy course, the policy maker will quickly discard it. 
“They also judge whether the general public would at least tolerate the direc-
tions pursued at the elite level. Without tolerance, the potential for retribution 
at the polls is likely to torpedo the idea in Congress [or in the case of Austria, 
the parliament]” (163). Kingdon also notes that despite questions of opinion 
poll validity, the important thing to remember is that those in power still place 
great importance on them (147, 149).  
Political leaders also place great importance on the cohesion or conflict 
among organized interest groups. Organized political forces include interest 
group pressure, political mobilization, such as grass-roots movements, and 
￿avour￿￿r of political elites. If there is consensus among those groups pro-
moting a problem or policy, then those in government are more likely to listen. 
If, as is more often the case, conflict among the interested parties results in a 
perceived balance between those for and those against a policy, government is 
likely to assume there is a “balance of organized forces” which “mitigates 
against any change at all” (Kingdon 151).  
Kingdon expands on this observation in the political process by suggesting 
a cause for such stalemates. “One major reason, for governmental inertia is the 
nearly inevitable building of clientele in ￿avour of an existing program. Once 
a government program is established, the clientele it benefits organizes into an 
impressive collection of interest groups whose major purpose is to protect the 
program from which they draw their sustenance. Not only does this clientele 
fend off attacks on the program, but it also makes consideration of proposals 
that might change the program difficult” (152). 
Kingdon notes two other characteristics of organized interest – like politi-
cians, they will do a cost-benefit analysis to see if the policy is worth the in-
vestment of resources and reputation (151). The other characteristic that gives 
organized interest greater influence in the political process is that they some-
times have representation disproportionate to their numbers (150). Kingdon’s 
final research regarding organized interest groups, however, is that, 
“…powerful interests are sometimes overcome, and change occurs despite 
their opposition” (163). 
There is little doubt that the major influences in the political stream are pub-
lic mood, role of government, including elections and jurisdiction, and organ-
ized interest groups; yet, Kingdon is quick to caution that these can not be 
viewed equally (164). “In particular, the complex of national mood and elec-
tions seems to create extremely powerful impacts on policy agendas, impacts 
capable of overwhelming the balance of organized forces” (164). But this is 
mitigated by the fact that national mood and elections set the agenda; whereas, 
organized interests tend to affect the availability of alternatives (164).  
There is one final difference to point out before we proceed to Kingdon’s   21
analysis of coupling and policy windows. According to Kingdon, the process 
of consensus building takes place both within the policy and political streams. 
Within the policy stream, the policy community is busy presenting, discussing, 
modifying, and discarding various ideas over long periods of time. They create 
a short list of alternatives that they eventually come back to over and over 
again largely by the processes of diffusion and persuasion (139-141, 163). 
Within the political stream, process of consensus building becomes more of a 
bargaining  process, taking on aspects of favors, and fears of lost benefits 
(159-160). 
Once an idea finally “catches on”, one sees the effects of “tipping” and 
“bandwagoning” where perceptions “tip” in ￿avour of a specific policy and 
participants are suddenly quick to “jump on the bandwagon” to insure they 
receive any and all possible benefits (161). These effects usually precede the 
opening of a policy window or a window of opportunity in which all three 
process streams come together long enough to allow for policy change.  
VI.  Coupling and Windows 
The intricacies of Kingdon’s model are perhaps best explained by him: “The 
separate streams com together at critical times. A problem is recognized, a so-
lution is developed, and available in the policy community, a political change 
makes it the right time for policy change, and potential constraints are not se-
vere” (165). It is only when the streams join that the potential for a policy win-
dow to open is at its greatest; yet, predicting when a window will open or how 
long it will remain open is often difficult. 
Kingdon’s research has found that, more often than not, policy windows do 
not happen very often and even when they do, they do not stay open for very 
long (166). Identifying why and when a policy window opens is the purpose of 
Kingdon’s model of agenda setting. By following events, conditions, and par-
ticipants within each of the three processes streams and observing for signs of 
coupling, one begins to get a sense of how potential policy windows appear. 
One also begins to see a way to make sense of the enormous task of analyzing 
data, events, moods, perceptions, and values.  
It is often easy to discern when a policy window has opened. The appear-
ance of a policy window means that a change in the political stream has 
pushed the issue or item onto the decision agenda and action will most likely 
be taken in the form of policy change (166, 168). This would generally mean a 
change in public mood or the turnover of key political positions. The absence 
of an issue or item from the decision agenda generally indicates that either a 
window has already opened and closed without anyone recognizing it (possi-
ble, but not likely) or that one has simply not opened yet. 
It is important at this point to reiterate the effects of the various process 
streams on the agenda and alternatives. The problem and political streams af-  22 
fect the setting of the governmental agenda; whereas, the policy stream affects 
the specification of alternatives (168). The appearance of a policy window or 
the coupling of all three process streams enhances the likelihood of an item 
going from the governmental agenda to the decision agenda (178). 
Thus far, the focus of this paper has largely been on the processes that pro-
mote an issue onto the agenda. However, as I mentioned earlier, understanding 
why issues drop from the agenda is nearly as important as determining how 
they succeeded in getting onto the agenda in the first place. This is where the 
process of coupling plays a critical role. At the time a policy window opens, 
all three streams must come together or couple; otherwise, the window quickly 
closes (178). Here, too, is where policy entrepreneurs play a significant role in 
bringing the various streams together (181-182).  
Once an idea’s time has come, it can also quickly pass. Those in power may 
feel that the problem has been addressed or they failed to get the desired re-
sults and no longer want to invest their resources (169). Or, those participants 
or focusing events, which caused a window to open in the first place, may dis-
appear or be replaced by an even greater problem or a newly elected official. 
Finally, the absence of available alternatives will cause a window to close 
(169). The end result is that a problem did not make it from the governmental 
agenda onto the decision agenda and no policy change will happen. 
While Kingdon admits that determining when a window will open is diffi-
cult at best, he does note that, “any residual randomness in predicting when a 
window will open does not invalidate the entire process” by which issues 
make it onto an agenda (189-190). He argues that by identifying the various 
constraints on the processes within each stream, such as “budgets, public ac-
ceptance, [and] the distribution of resources” one can also identify patterns 
within the various streams and thus find a measure of probability within each 
of the process streams (222-223). So, while Kingdon’s model is not consid-
ered predictive, there are identifiable elements within each process stream that 
when combined, allow for probability.  
The element of probability is rather attractive, when one considers the ran-
domness inherent in most areas of the social sciences. It is largely for purposes 
of gaining new insight into the complex issue of Austrian neutrality policy that 
I have selected Kingdon’s model. One of the inherent weaknesses of policy 
models is the potential for infinite regression when looking at historical setting 
and policy formation. That can also be said of Kingdon’s model; however, it is 
fortunate for the purposes of this study that neutrality policy in Austria had a 
clear origin in 1955, which will serve as a starting point for any historical 
analysis.  
As we shall see despite clear beginnings in 1955, neutrality policy is hardly 
a simple issue to follow given the economic and social ramifications of any 
change. As Kingdon so eloquently put it, “The formation of policy agendas   23
and the determination of the alternatives from which final choices are made 
are not tidy and tight” (222). The case of Austrian neutrality is no exception.  
IV.  Historical Context of Austrian Neutrality 
A. Why  Austria? 
Historically, neutrality has proven a rather successful instrument for Austrian 
foreign and domestic policy. While in the 1950s, neutrality was initially per-
ceived as a negative condition often associated with isolationism, economic 
limitations, and a withdrawal from power politics, the Austrians managed not 
only to make their presence felt on the international scene in the 1970s; but 
also, to construct a positive and uniquely Austrian identity around it. By the 
early 1980s, however, economic recessions, political upheaval in Eastern 
Europe and pressures from globalization revealed a crack in neutrality policy. 
By the mid-1980s, Austrian politicians could no longer afford to ignore these 
threats.  
A window of opportunity opened on December 9, 1988, when Soviet Pre-
mier Mikhail Gorbachev declared in a United Nations General Assembly ad-
dress that all nations, without exception should have “the freedom to deter-
mine their own destiny” (Judge & Langdon 240-241). With the collapse of 
Communism and the fall of the U.S.S.R. in 1991, the final hurdle to Austrian 
membership in the European Union was removed. Austria was now free to 
construct its economic and foreign policy without the threat of Soviet repri-
sals, although Austrian policy makers still had to move cautiously. In order to 
persuade both the Austrian people and the European Union that Austria could 
￿avour the requirements of membership, the Austrian government had to find 
a way to make neutrality compatible with EU membership. The process of “re-
contextualizing” neutrality required the joint efforts of Austria’s two main par-
ties and as Lantis/Queen have demonstrated, without the coordinated efforts of 
the Social Partners, the Austrian people would not have been persuaded to join 
the EU. 
While the 1994 popular referendum to join the European Union passed 2:1, 
voices among the opposition were quick to point out the dichotomy of consti-
tutional neutrality and membership in a regional military alliance. Despite this 
seeming disparity between law and policy, Austria became a full member of 
the European Union on January 1, 1995; and, in doing so, agreed to participate 
in the eventual development of a common security union that would eventu-
ally include a standing European army.  
Even though the historical context in which neutrality was formulated has 
significantly changed, the original purpose of neutrality still weighs heavily in 
the policy-making process. It is still popularly equated with establishing an 
Austrian national identity, but, in addition to maintaining domestic unity, neu-  24 
trality also continues to be an important domestic political tool for maintaining 
political stability and a check on nationalists and extremists. Any attempt to 
modify or abandon neutrality policy could be difficult at best given continuity 
with the past; yet, it appears efforts to reconcile EU membership with neutral-
ity finally came to a head in 2005, as Austria began to prepare to vote on the 
proposed European Constitutional amidst revising the national constitution. 
Underlying the parliamentary debate on both the federal and EU constitutions 
were the golden anniversary celebrations of independence, sovereignty, and 
the State Treaty, none of which would have been possible without constitu-
tional neutrality. Additionally, Austria celebrated the tenth anniversary of EU 
membership, a milestone that seemed to undermine the very foundations of 
neutrality law.  
None of the events of 2005 can be fully understood without understanding 
the historical context in which neutrality policy was adopted and evolved or 
without understanding the complex relationship between neutrality, Austrian 
identity, the EU, and Austria’s unique form of Consociational Democracy. 
The starting point for any explanation of neutrality is the Cold War, which es-
sentially lasted from 1945 until 1989, and influenced the policies and 
￿avour￿￿r of generations of Austrians. The golden era of neutrality under 
Chancellor Bruno Kreisky (1970-1983) is especially important when evaluat-
ing how neutrality was used to construct and manipulate the Austrian national 
image.  
Yet it is probably the events of the late 1980s and the resulting push for EU 
membership, which have had the greatest impact on neutrality policy and po-
litical events in 2005. Increased pressure to demonstrate solidarity and comply 
with the EU’s mutual assistance pact as outlined in the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP), as well as successive revisions to Austria’s own secu-
rity and defense policy, have created policy confusion, which in turn has led to 
increased political tension – a tension which in 2000 threatened to spill over 
into an international incident, as the far-right, nationalist Freiheitliche Partei 
Österreichs (FPÖ) or Freedom Party, under charismatic leader Jörg Haider 
joined the Österreichische Volkspartei (ÖVP) in a minority coalition in Feb-
ruay of that year.  
The common link to all of these events is the ongoing battle over neutrality; 
and, what role, if any, neutrality should play in Austria’s future, especially 
within a supranational military alliance. While Kingdon’s model of agenda 
setting and policy formation will later be used to provide insight into the cur-
rent policy situation, it still relies to some extent on historical regression in 
order to understand why the problem and alternatives have not adequately 
been identified. More importantly, it is also able to explain why the Austrian 
people are not the only political force blocking any real changes to neutrality 
policy.    25
B. Explaining  Austria 
The context in which Austrian neutrality was conceived, evolved and “re-
contextualized” is best explained by first examining the historical conditions, 
from its Cold War inception. This includes the formulation of law and policy, 
to its evolution as a symbol for post-war national identity and finally to the 
process of “re-contextualization” which prepared the way for EU membership 
in 1995 and the present security and defense environment. Along the way, the 
role of the Austrian government in promoting neutrality will be addressed, 
since much of neutrality’s success as a foreign policy is due to the uniquely 
Austrian political processes of “Consociational Democracy” or “consociation-
alism”. These invariably resulted in the uniquely Austrian political institutions 
of the “Social Partnership”, “Corporatism”, and “Proporz”.  
VI.  Historical Context of Neutrality Policy & Law 
The historical context in which neutrality originated and evolved began with 
the end of World War II. Operating under allied occupation at the start of 
1945, the reformed Austrian provisional government under federal Chancel-
lors, Karl Renner (1945) and Leopold Figl (1945-1953), began the process of 
damage control and reconstruction. Unlike Germany, Austria had an ace up its 
sleeve. The 1943 Moscow Declaration, declaring Austria the first victim of 
Nazi aggression, allowed for special concessions – most specifically, the abil-
ity to sue for a separate peace. Still, the Austrian State Treaty did not happen 
for another ten years. Even then, the conditions, which the Austrian govern-
ment agreed to, were less than ideal. In exchange for the end to allied occupa-
tion, full sovereignty, and independence, Austria would declare its constitu-
tional neutrality “of its own free will”.  
Once the State Treaty was signed, on May 15, 1955, Austria quickly set 
about convincing both the international community and its own citizens that 
neutrality was a good thing. Ultimately, however, the influence of the Soviet 
Union as a superpower, the difficulties in defining neutrality within the Cold 
War environment and the need to forge a new national identity would domi-
nate the next thirty years.  
VI.  Cold War (1945-1989) 
The influence of the Cold War on Austrian neutrality is profound. Caught be-
tween the Communist East and the Capitalist West, Austria sought to find its 
own way after being stripped of the ability to join any economic union that 
could potentially draw it into a conflict – especially one that included Ger-
many. National defense in the case of attack or invasion was considered token, 
with the prevailing expectation being that NATO, under the auspices of the   26 
UN, would come to the rescue after it was probably too late (Pelinka “Out” 
161). Consigned to playing “second cousin” to a larger, more strategically im-
portant West Germany, Austria fought to keep its position as a world player 
while protecting the nascent national image and social welfare economy it had 
carefully created after the war.  
Despite carefully controlling its domestic policy, Austria could do little in 
the face of events during the summer and fall of 1989 as thousands of vaca-
tioning East German tourists fled across the Hungarian border into Austria 
(Viets). Caught between political events in East and West Germany, Austria 
and Hungary once again became allies in order to assist Germany. However, 
no one anticipated the consequences this event would have on Austrian neu-
trality. For some political observers, events had come full circle as Germany 
reunited. Others felt that Europe had finally found closure from World War II 
with the reunification of Germany – but what closure was there for Austria? 
Thirty-four years of neutrality could not be abandoned over night. Nor could 
Austrians ignore the historical context in which neutrality was imposed. Even 
as Austria began negotiations in the spring of 1989 for membership in the 
European Economic Community, it had to return to its past in order to “re-
contextualize” the future of neutrality. 
VI.  Constructing Identity 
Austrian neutrality has two components: law and policy, both of which are 
based on a variety of written sources and customs. Although Austria had 
flirted with neutrality during the First Republic, it was not seriously consid-
ered as an option at the time (Österreichische Gesellschaft 9-10). The first in-
dication that neutrality could be a viable policy came after World War II dur-
ing allied occupation and the start of the Cold War. As the occupation wore 
on, it appeared that Austria’s fate would be coupled to that of Germany’s if 
something drastic were not done. Several Austrian politicians began to enter-
tain the idea of neutrality, which had worked for other small European nations, 
such as Sweden and Switzerland.  
While experts still disagree about the role the Soviets played in establishing 
neutrality and who was the first person to suggest it as a treaty option, there is 
no doubt that a final settlement could not have been reached without the Sovi-
ets’ endorsement (Liebhart 13). Prior to 1955, any discussion of Austria’s 
situation by the allies was linked to the German question. It was not until Sta-
lin’s death in March 1953 that a discernable policy shift towards an Austrian 
settlement was seen and the negotiations, which had started in 1947, began 
once again in earnest (Allard 105, Scheuch 8).  
It is interesting to note that just before the April meeting in Moscow, a con-  27
ference took place between the newly elected Chancellor Raab
2 and the Aus-
trian ambassadors to London, Moscow, Paris, and Washington on March 28, 
1955 (Giesinger). They met to discuss the implications of the Soviet invita-
tion; since, it was generally believed at the time that any agreement could not 
be reached unless all four allied powers were present. It is clear from the tran-
script that the Austrian leadership did not rule out the possibility that the Sovi-
ets would present them with a viable settlement offer.  
In the meeting, Bischoff, Austrian ambassador to Moscow, noted that recent 
trends showed the Soviets were constructing a neutral zone from “Lübeck to 
Triest”. “Diese Linie wird immer mehr zur Realität und droht unser Land 
entzweizuschneiden. Die Unterbrechung dieser Linie scheint augenblicklich 
eine der wichtigsten Aufgaben der russischen Diplomatie zu sein. Deren Ideal 
ist es, einen Zustand in Europa herbeizuführen, bei dem eine neutrale Zone 
￿avour￿￿r￿fy￿t, ähnlich wie sie im Norden bereits durch Schweden und 
Finnland repräsentiert wird. Eine derartige Neutralitätszone, umfassend die 
Schweiz, Österreich und Jugoslawien würde Donaueuropa abschirmen“ (Gie-
singer). This observance shows that the Austrians had a fairly clear under-
standing of Soviet objectives and understood that neutrality might be the only 
way to avoid either becoming a Soviet satellite or being permanently divided 
along allied occupied zones. Martin Herz’s memoir Understanding Austria 
also demonstrates that the Soviet occupation policy in Austria from 1945 to 
1955 was similar to its other occupied or “protected” territories, thus 
￿avour￿￿ing the fear that Austria could very easily become a Soviet satel-
lite. What differentiated Austria from its former Habsburg territories and other 
Eastern bloc neighbors was the degree to which the Western allies would fight 
to keep Austria firmly in the Western sphere of influence and the marked lack 
of Communist sympathy among its own labor force.
3 
It did not, however, make the condition of neutrality in the final settlement 
any more acceptable to the Austrian leadership. In addition to the potential 
economic and political isolation, there was the issue of security and defense. 
Neutrality was perceived by many nations, including the Americans, as a 
negative situation (Ruddy). Although neutrality had been suggested as early as 
1945, it would clearly be used as a last resort (Waldheim 53, 56-57 “Aus-
trian”)
4. Bundeskanzler Raab noted at the end of the March 28th meeting, “Für 
                                           
2   Raab officially assumed office April 2, 1953. Gehler and Kaiser point out that the new 
Raab government was quick to support “a policy of permanent neutrality in exchange for 
securing Austria’s territorial integrity and regaining national sovereignty" (82). 
3   See Herz. In his capacity as Political Officer with the U.S. legation in Austria (1945-
1948), Herz documented relations between the Allied Council and the Austrian govern-
ment, noting the various positions of the allied governments and the impact their policies 
had on Austria.  
4   Documentation for post World War II neutrality discussions go back as far as 1945. Ac-  28 
uns ergeben sich schwierige Fragen, wenn wir in eine Neutralisierung einstei-
gen, insbesonders wegen Deutschland. Wer wird dann die Russen aufhalten, 
wenn sie bis zum Atlantik marschieren wollen. Andererseits können wir die 
gebotene Hand nicht zurückweisen. Wir wollen aber keine österreichische Un-
abhängigkeit unter russischem Protektorat” (Giesinger). Concerns that neutral-
ity would not insure a complete withdrawal of Soviet troops or return total in-
dependence were repeatedly brought up by the assembled diplomats in which 
their final understanding was, “…daß Österreich in ￿avour Weise dem Kom-
munismus eine Tür öffnen werde” (Giesinger).  
Clearly, Austrian politicians did not consider neutrality to be an ideal situa-
tion, but given the conditions between the United States and the Soviet Union 
in 1955, it was definitely the lesser of two evils (Scheuch 8). The Austrian 
government was under pressure to end allied occupation. They would accept 
the condition of neutrality only if it came with total independence, sover-
eignty, and territorial integrity. The result of the April 1955 Soviet-Austrian 
meeting was a joint memo agreeing to terms that would later be spelled out in 
a final treaty. Austrian neutrality agreed to during the April visit to Moscow 
was formally proposed in the bi-lateral agreement called the Moscow Memo-
randum. It was to be ￿avour￿￿ after the Swiss’ example, formalized in state 
treaty, and eventually codified into Federal Law on October 26, 1955.  
The Moscow Memorandum, the Austrian State Treaty, and the Federal Con-
stitutional Article (B-VG BGBl. 1955/211) form a “triumvirate” upon which 
Austrian neutrality policy has traditionally been interpreted. In addition to 
these state documents, Austria agreed to abide by international laws and 
customs set forth in the 1907 Hague Convention when it joined the United Na-
tions in December 1955. Yet, despite international laws and customs, neutral 
countries have primarily based their neutrality on custom or precedent, even 
when treaties or agreements exist. It is this latitude in determining how neu-
trality will be interpreted that has provided the Austrian government with the 
tools to develop a post-war national identity around the self-imposed policy.  
Pelinka identifies two lessons Austrians learned from World War II: “Great-
ness doesn’t pay; and, to be German, means to be on the losing side” (“Out” 
13-14). Inside of thirty years, Austria had experienced two world wars. In both 
                                                                                                                                  
cording to K. Waldheim, Chancellor L. Figl mentioned neutrality in a November 25, 
1945 government statement (Waldheim 53). A month later, K. Renner reputedly pro-
posed a “Swiss” form of neutrality in a Dec. 19, 1945 report to the provisional govern-
ment (Waldheim 53). Waldheim also adds that as early as April 1952, neutrality was in-
cluded in a parliamentary debate (Waldheim 56-57). Allard suggests that it was Bruno 
Kreisky, as Foreign Secretary, who first proposed an “alliance-free” policy after exile in 
Sweden (Allard 50-51). Kreisky had read aloud the Swiss Declaration of Neutrality at 
the Congress of Vienna in March of 1955, which supposedly led the Soviets to believe 
Austria preferred that form of neutrality (Allard 224).   29
In both cases, they had suffered severe losses while fighting on the side of 
Germany. The cultural link to Germany had become too great a liability 
(Unterberger 70). Austrians would have to find a way to make their small, 
neutral democracy succeed while rejecting their German heritage; but if Aus-
trians were no longer part of a Grand Monarchy and union with Germany was 
out of the question, what was left to build on?  
By the time the State Treaty was signed, the majority of Austrians believed 
that they were better off without Germany; however, there was still a void that 
needed to be filled. Both democracy and neutrality were relatively new and 
untested conditions (Waldheim “Austrian” 52, 75). “Anfangs wurde nur wenig 
getan, um die Bevölkerung mit dem neuen Status vertraut zu machen. Anfangs 
musste vor allem das Misstrauen vieler Österreicher, darunter führender Ver-
treter der Sozialdemokratie, überwunden werden, Neutralität könnte einen i-
deologischen Anstrich bekommen und zu einer schleichenden Sowjetisierung 
führen“ (Zemanek “Wie lange”). The fear that neutrality could lead to political 
instability or eventual re-occupation was soon tested in 1956 during the Hun-
garian uprising. Even though events in Hungary brought to the fore Austria’s 
vulnerability in the face of Soviet aggression, it reinforced the belief that neu-
trality was a viable security and defense policy for Austria (Scheuch).  
Despite the resolve to begin anew, there was some measure of continuity 
with the past. For lack of anything better, Austria had reinstated an outdated 
constitution from the First Republic. Old religious, racial, and authoritarian 
attitudes also re-emerged (Sully “Political effects” 239) and underlying all of 
this was the question of what to do with former Nazi party members (Pelinka 
“Out” 19). Ultimately, a new identity construct had to be found; and, it would 
have to be re-enforceable and able to withstand the pressures to fall back on 
old habits or ways (Thaler 141). The task of re-inventing the nation in 1945 
fell primarily to Austria’s two largest political parties: the Austrian Social 
Democrats (SPÖ) and the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) who during the First 
Republic had been violent rivals.
5 “Since 1945, when the Communists had 
also participated briefly, the government had been made up of a coalition be-
tween the two largest parties, the People’s Party and the Social Democrats. 
Their predecessors in the days of the First Republic had fought each other bit-
terly, not only in Parliament but also in the streets” (Allard 41). The political 
instability that had marked the failure of the First Republic was still fresh in 
the minds of many Austrians, including Chancellor Renner, who had been 
Chancellor under the First Republic from 1918 to 1920. 
Unlike conditions in 1918 under the First Republic, Austrians at least felt 
some affiliation to the democratically elected government of the Second 
Republic (Jankowitsch 361-362, Rauchbauer). Even though the parties were 
re-established along the traditional milieu of religion, class and ethnicity, their                                             
5   See Pelinka “Out” 22, Wright “Introduction” 2, and Thaler 59 for additional information 
on the impact of the political parties in the First and Second Republics.   30 
established along the traditional milieu of religion, class and ethnicity, their 
fervent commitment to co-operation and stability became a hallmark of the 
Second Republic (Pelinka “Out” 74; Allard 44).  
The flexibility of the Austrian constitution, which had not saved the First 
Republic, did allow for many extra-constitutional processes to emerge after 
1945, along with the unusual political partnership formed by the two main po-
litical parties, the SPÖ and the ÖVP, which created what Pelinka calls, “the 
domestic equivalent of neutrality” (“Out” 37-38, 91). Extra-constitutional or 
consociational aspects of Austria’s government have also meant unique struc-
tures and processes have developed alongside Austria’s legal structures. Pe-
linka references Arend Lijphart’s four characteristics of consociational democ-
racies in order to better identify the political processes in Austria: formation of 
a grand coalition, mutual veto or “concurrent majority” rule, proportionality 
with respect to political representation and a high degree of autonomy for each 
segment of the political system (“Out” 22). These characteristics of consocia-
tionalism became the extra-constitutional institutions of the Social Partnership, 
Proporz, and Corporatism in Austria, which have significantly influenced the 
political environment of neutrality since the end of World War II. This form of 
appeasement, according to Pelinka, was a lesson from the First Republic and 
was designed to minimize political unrest (“Out” 23). Pelinka goes on to argue 
that since Austrians previously did not place much importance on the written 
constitution the influence of traditions or customs on the establishment of law 
has played a greater role (“Out” 42).  
In reality, this has meant a domestic version of neutrality in which all par-
ties avoided conflict in order to promote the larger ideal of peace and stability 
abroad at the cost of diversity of opinion. Rauchbauer expanded on this opin-
ion noting, “In the Austrian context, consociationalism refers to the close rela-
tionship between the two main political parties, the socialist SPÖ and the 
Christian Democratic ÖVP, and virtually all institutions that have any influ-
ence over Austria’s political system. In practice, it meant until recently that if 
you wanted to get anywhere in Austria, it was advisable to be a member of one 
of these two parties” (Rauchbauer). This has also meant that the two largest 
political parties have historically exhibited a greater influence on the agenda 
process than perhaps even the federal government. In other words, only those 
issues or problems that the two main parties wanted to address have tradition-
ally made it onto the agenda. This was reinforced by the nature of the Austrian 
constitution, which was considered extremely flexible and was easy to amend.  
In avoiding party conflict, the Austrians turned compromise to a political art 
form. There was something in it for everyone – including the losers. “Accord-
ing to an unwritten and strictly observed law, the coalition party with the most 
parliamentary seats was entitled to name the head of the government, the fed-
eral chancellor. According to the same unwritten law, the vice-chancellor be-  31
longed to the other coalition party” (Allard 42). This practice extended to the 
appointment of secretaries under ministers – posts would be divided between 
the two ruling parties (Allard 49). The practice of “Proporz” or proportional 
distribution of offices between the two largest parties will be covered in 
greater depth as the various political offices and processes that have the great-
est influence over setting the national agenda are examined.  
This domestic form of neutrality has been regarded as compromise designed 
to reduce social unrest and promote stability. The focus on conflict manage-
ment and co-operation between the government, business and labor also came 
to be a symbol of Austrian postwar identity (Thaler 35). Pelinka notes, “The 
ÖVP-SPÖ alliance had to prove that this new kind of cooperation was the pa-
triotic Austrian answer to the Nazi experience. And the alliance also had to 
prove that it was the only alternative to Communism. Without this alliance, 
there would be chaos and dictatorship and foreign rule” (“Out” 24). Missiroli 
writes, “Even in disagreement, though, the parties contained their differences 
very carefully, on the principle that Austria’s foreign policy had to be predict-
able and constant so that Austria would be considered (first of all by Moscow) 
as a stabilizing force in Europe” (“Austria” 2). “Domestic neutrality” would 
become a political tool to promote an identity.  
Fear of instability and change invariably reinforced consociationalism and 
the neo-corporatist arrangements of the Social Partnership. “The two major 
camps [ÖVP-SPÖ] controlled not only the parties but also the organized eco-
nomic interests. There was no significant voice on the corporatist level that 
was not controlled by the parties, and no significant voice was heard on the 
government level unless it was under the control of major economic interest 
groups” (Pelinka 25 “Out”). This extra-constitutional division of government 
or proportional allocation of jobs between the two main parties extended from 
cabinet posts right down to the lowest civil service positions and came to be 
known as “Proporz” (Rauchbauer, Ulram 213-214). To a large extent, it rein-
forced the government’s commitment to neutrality – both at home and abroad 
– through a show of political solidarity.  
While it was not the immediate intention of leadership to develop a national 
consciousness centered on neutrality, a new “Austrian identity” was emerging 
as a result of concerted efforts by the Socialists and the People’s Party to es-
tablish and sustain social peace (Gehrlich “National” 237). Thaler notes that, 
“In order to achieve their national goals, the postwar Austrian elites had to 
transform the existing national consciousness of an already politicized modern 
population that is; they had to change the reference group while maintaining 
the existing level of consciousness” (2). In effect, the Austrian leadership had 
to demonstrate internationally that Austria was a “peaceful, stabile nation”, 
finding ways to redirect attention away from anything German while cultivat-
ing those positive aspects of what it means to be Austrian in order to achieve   32 
social stability, prosperity and security. Neutrality became a symbol for Aus-
tria’s rise from the ashes and a critical tool in the construction of post-war 
identity. 
Throughout the early years of the Grand Coalition, the SPÖ-ÖVP partner-
ship reiterated the importance of neutrality in securing Austria’s sovereignty, 
independence and territorial integrity. In the 1960s, it would also come to 
symbolize a new cultural “tradition”. In his May 1965 State Address com-
memorating the signing of the State Treaty, Chancellor Josef Klaus (ÖVP, 
1964-1970) equated neutrality with this new Austrian tradition, while promot-
ing the idea of neutrality as a positive force that would define a new Austria as 
a stabilizing force between east and west (Österreichische Gesellschaft 117-
118). This was the beginning of Austria’s emergence onto the international 
scene as a world player, which under Kreisky would expand Austria’s impor-
tance disproportionate to its small size. 
The perception of Austria as a peaceful “buffer zone” between the two su-
perpowers only reinforced Austria’s developing self-image and the belief that 
neutrality was a good thing. By 1965, the majority of Austrians firmly be-
lieved any association with Germany was unrealistic and unwanted, and that 
the current government could actually be trusted to represent their interests 
(Waldheim “Austrian” 52; Jankowitsch 361-362). This was a far cry from the 
social unrest and political instability of the interwar years. Still, it was not un-
til the 1965 proclamation of the Austrian national holiday that popular accep-
tance of an “Austrian” identity was first noted and celebrated (Gehrlich “Na-
tional” 237).  
Throughout the 1960s, neutrality would become a depository for those feel-
ings and emotions that had gone unaddressed since the end of the war and the 
Grand Coalition promoted this link in order to facilitate reconstruction, stabil-
ity and prosperity. The proclamation of Neutrality on October 26, 1955 was 
the first sovereign act of the new Republic and soon became associated with a 
multitude of positive images (Lahodynsky). The fact that it took the Austrian 
government 10 years to proclaim that day a national holiday suggests that at 
the time of the State Treaty, they did not focus on the symbolic meaning of 
neutrality in constructing post war identity, so much as neutrality as a tool to 
achieve postwar reconstruction and a return to “normalcy”. It was not until 10 
years later, on the 10
th anniversary of the signing of the neutrality law that po-
litical leaders were ready to imbue neutrality with symbolic meanings such as 
independence, sovereignty, security. However, unlike most countries where 
the national holiday commemorates the founding of the nation, Austria’s na-
tional holiday recognizes the withdrawal of foreign troops from Austrian soil 
and the passage of a law – specifically, neutrality – in order to regain sover-
eignty (Gehrlich “National” 224). Still, the connection between neutrality and 
those qualities sought by every nation cannot be ignored. With the announce-  33
ment of a national holiday, Austrians began to consciously associate neutrality 
with a uniquely “Austrian” identity and the political parties began to see it 
more as a tool to manipulate popular opinion (Wright “Introduction” 2-3).  
The success of neutrality not only as a foreign policy tool, but also as a tool 
for constructing a new, uniquely Austrian identity is largely due to the politi-
cal acumen of the political leaders at the time.
6 However, Thaler argues that 
rather than having to start from scratch, Austrian leaders had only to dig back 
in their recent past to transform old ideas and expressions, redefining them in 
new terms and allowing them to crystallize within the realm of public opinion 
(162). This would account for much of the continuity with the past as with the 
re-establishment of those political parties and institutions, including the 1921 
Constitution, from the First Austrian Republic. 
By the late 1960s, it can be said that neutrality went from being a policy 
tool, initially used to pacify the allies and international community, to a politi-
cal tool used by the Grand Coalition to promote a new “tradition” of social 
peace, prosperity, and freedom. In learning from the past, the two main par-
ties, the SPÖ and the ÖVP, had developed a uniquely Austrian system of 
compromise and cooperation, a type of domestic neutrality, in which they 
were able to promote economic and social stability. They were also able to 
promote neutrality as a successful policy for promoting regional, if not global, 
stability. With every challenge to neutrality, Austria’s leadership adapted the 
policy to suit national needs. From the very beginning, while still negotiating 
the terms in the Moscow Memorandum, Austrian leadership had fought to 
maintain control over how Austrian neutrality would be defined, insisting that 
theirs would not be “an ideological” neutrality and that it would also be “an 
active” one. The ability of the Austrian government to promote and manipu-
late the image of neutrality became somewhat of an art under the chancellor-
ship of Bruno Kreisky (SPÖ) from 1970 to 1983. Still, towards the end of his 
chancellorship, in the late 1970s, pressures from globalization, new social 
movements, and the failure of long-term governmental intervention, along 
with a series of focusing events, set the stage for change.  
VI.  Kreisky Era (1970-1983) 
While the Austrian government’s primary objectives after declaring neutrality 
were to find a role for the small republic within the new European order and to 
garner both international and domestic support for the new policy, it still took 
the better part of the next two decades for either task to be fully realized. Al-
                                           
6   See Gehrlich, “National consciousness and national identity: A contribution to the po-
litical culture of the Austrian system” in the Austrian Party System for additional infor-
mation on how identity was consciously used by Austria’s ruling elite to re-define Aus-
trian identity after 1945.   34 
ready in 1955, the door to international legitimacy and acceptance had been 
opened, thanks in large part to membership in the UN (Österreichische Gesell-
schaft 119, 156-157). However, Austria was still primarily focused on 
￿avouring internal stability, which was critical to achieving legitimacy for the 
international image of a peaceful, neutral country and placating the Soviets.  
Shortly after Kreisky was elected chancellor in 1970, Austria was declared 
an “Insel der Seligen”.
7 It was clear that enough time had passed making it 
feasible for Austria to shift foreign policy from a regional platform to a global 
one; and, in doing so, re-establish Austria as a “world player”. This image of 
Austria as an international meeting place was reinforced in 1979 when Vienna 
became the Third UN City thanks in large part to neutrality (APIS “Austrian 
Foreign”). Although the push for a UN presence in Vienna originally came 
from the People’s Party, popular belief holds that Chancellor Bruno Kreisky 
was personally responsible for the honor – a misconception, he has admitted to 
promoting (Kreisky 54). 
While Kreisky did not establish an international role for Austria, he did suc-
cessfully promote the policies of previous governments to the point of 
chauvinism and in so doing, restored pride to Austria. Lantis/Queen note, it 
was Kreisky along his Foreign Minister, Rudolf Kirchschläger, who chose to 
avoid EEC relations in the 1960s and 1970s and instead focused on relations 
with non-aligned and less developed nations, especially those in the Middle 
East and Central America (154-155). As with the establishment of the United 
Nation’s third city, many of Kreisky’s achievements were the result of careful 
image manipulation centered on the personal conviction that neutrality could 
be used to establish global peace and being present when “windows of oppor-
tunity” had opened (Kreisky 55-56).  
At a public address in Zürich, Switzerland, in May 1958, Foreign Minister 
Kreisky outlined a “Brückefunktion” for Austria between Eastern Europe and 
the West based on Austria’s geopolitical location and history within Central 
Europe (Österreichische Gesellschaft 112). Under Kreisky, this “Brückefunk-
tion” would later be extrapolated to include other parts of the globe with a re-
vised “active” neutrality policy (and Austria!) at the political center of each 
development. This foreign policy concept, built around Austria’s unique status 
as a neutral nation at the geographical and political “center” of Europe, would 
become known as “the Austrian Way”, “the Third Way”, or “the Austrian 
Example”.  
Under Kreisky, “active” neutrality no longer meant simply ideological free-
dom or the ability to defend one’s borders militarily as it had in the 1950s. It 
now meant “active participation” at the international level – not only in the 
UN – but also as a mediator between the communist East and capitalist West, 
                                           
7   It was Pope Paul VI, who during an unofficial trip to Austria in 1971 designated Austria 
as an “Insel der Seligen”.   35
the industrialized North and under-developed South. Austria would assume a 
“Brückefunktion” in which Austrian understanding of former Habsburg terri-
tories would lead to reduction in tensions between the two super powers (Bock 
159). Active neutrality would also be used to promote human rights, as well as 
peace and understanding between the economically developed northern coun-
tries and those nations which had until recently been European colonies. In 
Figure 2, Mayrzedt/Hummer’s conceptualization of Kreisky’s policy of “ac-
tive neutrality” shows the central role neutrality played in foreign and domes-
tic policy in addition to establishing a visual reference for Kreisky’s “Austrian 
Way” (Österreichische Gesellschaft 2).  
Figure 2: “Neutralitätskonzept”  
 
Source: “Neutralitätskonzept” from Österreichische Gesellschaft f. Aussenpolitik u. inter-
nationale Beziehungen, Band 9/1 (1975: 2). The diagram represents the relation of 
neutrality policy to the various issues affecting Austrian foreign policy.    36 
Gehler/Kaiser noted the result of Kreisky’s “Austrian Way”: “...temporarily 
secured for Austria a prominent international diplomatic role out of all propor-
tion to the country’s size or economic strength or strategic importance” (94). It 
also established Austria once again as “powerful, necessary and special”, rein-
forcing the link between neutrality and identity (Liebhart 23).  
Kreisky observed in his book, Die Zeit, in der wir leben: Betrachtungen zur 
internationalen Politik that “a true Austrian variation” of neutrality had been 
found (Kreisky 53). The nascent image of Austria as a free, democratic, sover-
eign, and neutral nation had slowly evolved into something more complex and 
enduring; and, the Austrian government under Kreisky was adept at manipu-
lating those resources necessary to rally support for its new image. The proc-
ess of image management was quite successful, thanks in large part to the sys-
tem of consociational democracy, Proporz, and state ownership of most of the 
media.  
In addition to state-owned media coverage, periodic symposia, and confer-
ences were held under the auspices of various federal ministries. Bureaucrats 
and scholars, who owed their patronage to either Social Partner, would natu-
rally promote the coalition’s agenda, in order to further domestic peace and 
stability. Anniversaries were seen as especially good times to present revised 
images of Austria “then” and “now”.
8 There is little doubt that Kreisky was 
able to utilize the existing bureaucracy and public institutions to promote his 
active neutrality policy and thus built domestic consensus for his “Austrian 
Way”; however, this approach has often been criticized as being patriarchal 
and an illusion.
9  
Still, there is no denying that Kreisky’s policy of “active neutrality” helped 
Austrians feel good about themselves once again. At the time Kreisky as-
sumed office, there still existed the very real fear that Austria was not taken 
seriously and seen as unimportant to larger nations (Schlesinger 140-143). 
Relegated to the periphery or edge of Europe meant obscurity and might even-
tually lead to economic or political instability. With limited maneuverability in 
Europe, Kreisky had to focus his efforts on finding other ways of meeting 
Austria’s needs. Seen in this light, the jump to international politics and global 
                                           
8   Excellent examples are the 16
th Symposium on the occasion of the 25
th anniversary of 
the State Treaty released by the Austrian Federal Ministry for Science and Research 
(Portisch & Janko) or with the 1976 “Project Ö ‘85”, in which 110 experts presented 
various possible scenarios for Austria’s future as a neutral country by 1985 (Veselsky).  
9   Pelinka pointed out, that “The state, politics, and not least of all national consciousness 
have been mandated from above – by the government, bureaucracy, party leaders and 
majority interest groups ( “Out” 226).” Gerlich noted that, “Among wide sectors of the 
population in Austria, national consciousness is less the result of active participation and 
or participatory traditions than in other countries” (“National” 227). He added, that there 
was still the tendency to treat individuals as subjects and not as citizens as well as for 
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markets was a natural progression. The fact that Austrians were able to iden-
tify in a positive way with many of the resulting policies was simply an added 
bonus. Austria was no longer an international social pariah, but had assumed 
the respected role of an international mediator and bridge between disparate 
parts of the globe. Permanent neutrality, it was understood, was only available 
to a few, special nations (Neuhold “Permanent” 179). However, it was not un-
til Kreisky that neutrality bestowed a “special” status on Austria and became 
part of national identity (Liebhart 20).  
VI.  “Re-contextualization” 
Towards the end of the 1980s, Austria’s economic situation became a serious 
problem (Lantis/Queen 161). Amidst the rising economic crises, Austrian 
business and industry began searching for policy solutions; and in 1987, the 
Federation of Austrian Industrialists or die Vereinigung der Österreichischen 
Industrie (VÖI) commissioned a study on the compatibility of EU membership 
with neutrality (Pelinka “Out” 165-166). In May 1987, they presented the 
Austrian government with the demand for EEC membership (Luif “Austrian” 
29). Support by other interest groups, chambers, and federations soon fol-
lowed, culminating in a final push from the ÖVP in January 1988 (Luif “Aus-
trian” 29). Additionally, Luif notes the request was made at a time when there 
were ￿avour￿￿r￿ political conditions. “A qualitative change in the integra-
tion policy of Austria’s government came only in mid-1986. A group of 
younger politicians from the SPÖ got important positions in the government” 
(Luif “Austrian” 27). Most importantly was the election Fred Vranitzky as 
chancellor (SPÖ) in 1986. Vranitzky (1986-1997) was the first Austrian chan-
cellor with no direct experience in World War II; and, with his election, politi-
cal conditions in Austria began to change (Pick 181). On April 31, 1989, the 
senior coalition partner, the SPÖ finally agreed to negotiations, provided the 
importance of neutrality was stressed. Underlying the government’s willing-
ness to consider membership in the EU was a series of focusing events that 
began with the signing of the Treaty of Rome and ended with the break-up of 
Yugoslavia.  
The success of the 1994 EU vote was underscored by focusing events, such 
as the signing of the Single European Act in 1987 and the fall of communism 
(1989-1991), which elevated the economic problem higher on the agenda and 
reinforced its prominence for nearly ten years. Additionally, the policy com-
munity successfully “re-contextualized” neutrality to allow for compatibility 
with EU membership. Within the political arena, the ÖVP and SPÖ were able 
to present a united front increasing the legitimacy, while the presence of key 
policy entrepreneurs, like Austrian Foreign Minister, Alois Mock and Chan-
cellor Vranitzky, were successfully able to execute a strategy of “double-
edged diplomacy” to insure electoral success on two fronts (Lantis/Queen).   38 
All of these conditions led to the opening of a policy window in 1994-95, 
when Austrians chose to join the European Union by a two-thirds majority 
(APIS “Austrian Foreign”).  
The events of 1994-95 could not have happened, however, without the con-
vergence of key process streams: recognition of an economic problem, avail-
ability of EU membership as a viable policy alternative to EFTA, and a 
￿avoutive political environment. In the case of Austria, the receptive political 
environment was helped significantly by the united front presented by the two 
main political parties. As Kingdon has suggested, understanding the key 
events and participants within these three process streams helps to understand 
the complex way in which issues makes it on to the governmental or national 
agenda, garner sufficient attention to make it onto the decision agenda and 
eventually become new policy. Nevertheless, as Kingdon also points out, suc-
cess in one policy area often creates problems in another (192). This has also 
been the case with EU membership and Austrian neutrality. Membership in an 
economic union would also require a show of political solidarity, including the 
means to secure and defend the economic investment. This, in turn, would 
mean membership in a military union, which was in direct violation of consti-
tutional neutrality. Invariably, conflict over how neutrality would continue to 
be interpreted would lead to the dissolution of the Social Partnership by the 
end of the 1990s. 
VI.  EU Membership: A Window of Opportunity 
Austria’s push to join the European Union is an excellent example of what can 
happen when Kingdon’s policy streams converge: the seemingly impossible 
happens. It is important to understand what happened in 1994 domestically for 
two reasons. In the first place, the success of the 1994 EU referendum caused 
a spillover of problems into other areas of Austrian national policy, specifi-
cally in the area of national security and defense. Secondly, it demonstrated 
the ability of the Austrian government to overcome popular opinion in order to 
achieve foreign policy objectives.  
While the initial push for EEC membership came from business and 
￿avoutry, the lobby was quickly taken up by the ÖVP, which included the 
request for EEC membership in its autumn 1988 Europamanifest (Missiroli 
“Austria” 14). But policy entrepreneurs lobbying for EU membership would 
first have to find a way to reconcile constitutional neutrality with membership 
in a supranational organization with military aspirations or at least, make the 
costs of membership “bearable”.  
As noted earlier, by the early 1980s, Austria had experienced lower eco-
nomic growth, a rising budget deficit, and rising unemployment, which only 
served to exacerbate the pressures to decentralize and restructure its welfare 
economy (Tálos/Horvath 28; Luif “Austrian” 29). A series of focusing events   39
in the late 1980s and early 1990s, including the signing of the Single European 
Act and the fall of communism, reinforced the need for change. Austrians also 
had to contend with increased social unrest in their own back yard as the vari-
ous ethnic regions of Yugoslavia devolved into ethnic “states” (Lantis/Queen 
164). While war was no longer considered a direct threat to Europe anymore, 
new threats transcended borders. Under these conditions, the SPÖ, nudged 
along by Vranitzky, agreed to pursue negotiations as long as they did not en-
danger neutrality. The economic problem attached to the proposed policy of 
EU membership had made it onto the governmental agenda in late 1988. 
By mid-1989, the Austrian government was ready to take the formal step 
toward economic integration with the EEC/EU
10. Lantis/Queen have proposed 
that consensus was pursued on two fronts: domestically and at the EU level. 
This meant reassuring the Austrian people that the benefits of membership far 
outweighed the costs, while convincing the EU partners that Austria would be 
able to meet the terms of membership – including those in a future, as yet un-
defined, security and defense alliance. Inevitably, the issue of Austria’s per-
manent neutrality came up on both fronts despite every effort by the Social 
Partners to avoid it.
11  
Lantis/Queen have suggested in their Double-Edge Diplomacy model that 
during domestic consensus building, two themes were repeated: Special con-
cessions for Austria and the potential economic benefits (165). In demanding 
special concessions, issues related to the European Union’s Common Foreign 
and Security Policy (CFSP) both the EU and Austrian government appear to 
have taken a “wait and see” approach to negotiating the status of neutrality.  
Domestically, arguments that neutrality was compatible with EU member-
ship were downplayed in an effort to minimize the anticipated adverse effects 
of membership (Höll/Pollak/Puntscher-Riekmann 6). The effort to keep neu-
trality off of the agenda, worked for the most part, as Austrians seemed to fo-
cus on the economic aspects of membership. Dr. Schmidt-Chiari, General di-
rector of Creditanstalt wrote in 1989, “Von einem bin ich überzeugt, das mag 
jetzt wiederum sehr pragmatisch klingen, ￿avo ein neutraler Staat seine Un-
abhängigkeit nur dann behaupten kann, wenn er auch wirtschaftlich stark ist” 
(10). The message coming from the Social Partners was to focus on fixing the 
                                           
10  Gehler & Kaiser have argued that it has always been Austria’s intent to join the EU and 
that the primary constraints to membership were the position of the Soviet Union prior 
to 1989 and finding a way to reconcile ‘military neutrality’ with membership in the EU 
(76). By 1991, fear of Soviet reprisal was removed and Austria had only to reconcile 
neutrality with membership in any CFSP developed by the EU. 
11  At home, the opposition FPÖ and Green parties campaigned against EU membership, 
arguing that the costs to the environment were too high, that there would be an increase 
in unemployment due to an influx if foreigners and most importantly, that membership 
would result in a loss of sovereignty.   40 
larger problem, which was the economy and not worry about neutrality, since 
issues pertaining to neutrality wouldn’t matter if Austria became economically 
unstable.  
The government’s message was delivered at both levels by effective policy 
entrepreneurs at both levels. Foreign Minster Alois Mock led the Austrian 
delegation and negotiated membership terms in Brussels, while the domestic 
publicity campaign consisted largely of the use of key policy promoters, such 
as President Klestil (ÖVP) and Chancellor Vranitzky. Additionally, numerous 
public speeches, guest appearances and symposia consisting of foreign policy 
experts were held (Lantis/Queen 165; Pick 8). Repeated assurances by policy 
entrepreneurs and the government that EU objectives were the same as Aus-
trian objectives assisted the policy community in the process of re-
contextualizing neutrality at the domestic level until it became compatible 
with EU membership (Luif “Austrian” 33; Sucharipa 85). 
Lantis/Queen note the second phase of the double-edge diplomacy began in 
1993 with the actual start of EU negotiations (168). When neutrality was ques-
tioned at the EU level, “The government made it clear that the interpretation 
and form of Austrian neutrality was a matter for Austria alone; and, that any 
negotiations on this subject by third parties were out of the question” (Laho-
dynsky). What was actually decided between the Austrian negotiators and the 
EU has remained unclear. Lahodynsky suggests that Austria relied on Articles 
223 and 224 of the EC Treaty to allow it to remain neutral despite EU pressure 
to show solidarity before eventually accepting Austria’s neutrality along with 
membership. Lantis/Queen concur, noting an “unofficial” March 1994 agree-
ment in which the EU would not use the Court of Justice in cases where Aus-
tria sought exemptions based on neutrality and to allow for a transition period 
(170).  
Lantis/Queen have also suggested that, “…the Commission quietly assured 
the government leaders that transitional or temporary measures might be en-
acted during the negotiations”. This implies that the Austrian negotiators could 
go home victorious and announce that they had received “special concessions” 
for neutrality, while softening up the public for an eventual repeal at some un-
specified future date. Gehler, however, maintains that Austrian negotiators 
made it clear at the time that neutrality would not be abandoned with member-
ship (52). Luif supports this position, adding that government statements re-
affirmed Austria’s stance that loopholes within the EC treaties had allowed for 
“re-interpretation” of neutrality, thus making it compatible with membership 
(“Austrian” 28-32). Still, Lantis/Queen point out that in the end, the govern-
ment had to have known going into negotiations that a military union of some 
kind was inevitable, given Title V of the 1992 Maastricht Treaty (152).  
Whatever the international agreement resulted in, domestically, the Austrian 
government still had to reassure the public that they would not be pulled into   41
future wars and that the EU would not demand military support in direct viola-
tion of neutrality at some later date. This was done by touting the benefits of 
membership in an regional economic union that was also committed to the de-
terrence of war, conflict, and revived nationalism; while at the domestic level, 
it was suggested that in joining the EU, Austria would return to the “heart of 
Europe” and have a say in how Europe’s future would be shaped. Continuity 
with a past, great Holy Roman identity and its “historic role” at the Center of 
Europe was often stressed to mitigate the fear of change – especially given the 
challenges in the East.  
In his “Austria First” campaign, Jörg Haider linked membership in the EU 
with a loss of sovereignty, which would result in a loss of identity. Although 
neutrality was reinforced as a “symbol” of sovereignty and national identity, it 
failed to garner sufficient public attention during the 1994 referendum. Both 
Pinnemore and Missiroli concluded that this was due in large part to the fact 
that the government did everything possible to keep a debate on neutrality 
from the agenda (Pinnemore 366-367; Missiroli “Austria” 13). Gehler sug-
gests that the public relations campaign avoided the issue of neutrality, largely 
because if the populace had been better informed, they would have rejected 
membership (54). 
Even though neutrality was definitely on the governmental agenda in 1994 
going into the national referendum, the Social Partners did everything possible 
to suppress a debate at home and neutrality did not figure prominently on the 
domestic agenda. The fact that during the EU negotiations Austria was never 
asked to rescind constitutional neutrality also helped to manage the domestic 
debate. In the end, the Austrian government was able to convince the EU that 
they would be able to participate fully in any CFSP while maintaining at home 
that neutrality was not open for discussion. 
In the days going up to the referendum, Foreign Minister Mock appealed to 
voters from his hospital bed in a June 5, 1994 radio address, “There are certain 
windows of opportunity in history, and if they are not opened at the right time, 
one misses historic changes for one’s country. There was such a window in 
1955….There is such a window again today” (qtd. In Lantis/Queen 172). The 
parallels drawn between 1955 and 1994 were not lost on the Austrian voters, 
who once again trusted in their leadership to see them through the difficult 
times ahead. On June 12, 1994, the EU accession treaty was passed. Just over 
82 % of eligible voters turned out, with 66.58% of them voting in ￿avour of 
the treaty and 33.4% voting against it (Gehler/Kaiser 96, APIS “Austrian For-
eign”). 
VI.  The “Fallout” & “Spillover” 
The events of 1994-95 could not have happened without the convergence of 
events in Kingdon’s policy streams: recognition of pressing economic prob-  42 
lems, membership in the EU as a viable policy alternative to EFTA, and a re-
ceptive political environment. Ultimately, however, the vote to join the EU 
resulted in political “fallout” that began shortly after Austria joined the EU in 
1995 and culminated with the break up of the SPÖ-ÖVP coalition in 1999. 
Although the EU was, and still is, viewed as a solution to Austria’s economic 
problems, membership requirements created a new set of problems, which in-
variably “spilled over” into other policy arenas, specifically, the area of na-
tional security and defense, which encompasses constitutional neutrality. 
It is generally accepted that consensus for EU membership was built by key 
policy entrepreneurs who found a way to make EU membership compatible 
with neutrality. Ironically, the fate of neutrality policy never really became an 
actual item on either the EU’s or the Austrian government’s decision agenda 
despite the overt implications of the proposed CFSP and potential impact of 
any future mutual assistance pact. Its prominence on the agenda was much 
lower than issues related to economic policy, or even the environment. Ac-
cording to Missiroli (“Austria”), as well as Lantis/Queen (171), this was due 
to the combined efforts of the Social Partners to minimize any open debates on 
neutrality until after a final decision on the EU had been made. Since the deci-
sion to join the EU was largely made by the ruling political elite (Missiroli 
“Austria” 17), it was not surprising that shortly after the referendum, the coali-
tion partners would suffer serious losses in regional and national elections as 
the realities of membership set in (Lantis/Queen 174). In October of 1994, this 
translated into the SPÖ and ÖVP both losing votes to the FPÖ; and, even 
though the numbers were not all that impressive, it did presage a trend in voter 
dissatisfaction with the status quo which had first been identified back in 1986 
(Lantis/Queen 174-175; Gehmacher/Birk/Ogris 93-94; Plasser/Ulram 69-70). 
Public confidence in the political system was shaken as the effects of Eastern 
European migration took hold, ethnic fighting in Yugoslavia continued, un-
employment rose, and the promised economic improvement failed to happen 
(Lantis/Queen 175). Höll/Pollak/Puntscher-Riekmann have suggested that the 
push to meet EU expectations came at a time when there were bureaucratic 
layoffs and unemployment fears rose (13). By the time most Austrians had 
fully realized the consequences of EU membership, it was too late.  
An exit poll conducted shortly after the EU referendum on membership 
found that roughly 46% were last-minute deciders (Plasser/Ulram 171). A lack 
of voter savvy going into the European elections has often been attributed to 
an attitude of unquestioning loyalty to authority (Traur/Birk 137). Pre-poll es-
timates had shown two-thirds of Austrian voters were still undecided going 
into the referendum and their decisions had largely been influenced by last 
minute appeals by prominent members of the Social Partnership (Thurow). 
Once the referendum to join the EU had finally passed, however, the political 
elite were unsure of which direction to take next and dissention between the   43
parties grew, culminating in the dissolution of the SPÖ-ÖVP partnership in 
1999. Membership requirements in the European Union had uncovered struc-
tural weaknesses in many of the domestic sectors, but most importantly, in the 
political sphere (Gehler/Kaiser 97). 
Höll/Pollak/Puntscher-Riekmann recently analyzed the structural changes 
which EU membership imposed on Austria and studied the link between level 
of support for the EU and the shift in political power domestically. “With EU 
membership the perception of the Austrian society as being composed of quite 
stable relationships of relatively equal interest groups suddenly was superim-
posed by the reality of antagonisms between winners and losers of the integra-
tion process” (7). In arguing the move from a consociational democracy to a 
competitive or pluralistic one, Höll/Pollak/Puntscher-Riekmann have echoed 
the arguments made recently by Pelinka, Gehler/Kaiser, as well as many other 
policy experts, who suggest that Austria has lost much of its “uniqueness” and 
become a “normal” democracy in the European sense (Höll/Pollak/Puntscher-
Riekmann 17; Pelinka “Out” 232). While part of this “normalization” process 
has been attributed to the rise of a true “third” party, namely that of the far 
right party, the FPÖ, it is also being attributed to voter education – that is, the 
ability of Austrian voters to make decisions outside of the paradigms of tradi-
tional milieu (Höll/Pollak/Puntscher-Riekmann 17). This “normalization” of 
Austria is also heavily dependent on the “Europeanization” of Austrian institu-
tions and political structures in the wake of EU integration 
(Höll/Pollak/Puntscher-Riekmann 17). This process of normalization is not 
without drawbacks. 
Gehler/Kaiser have attributed the rise of anti-European sentiment, capital-
ized on by populist leader, Jörg Haider, to the fear of change and to the gen-
eral stresses from having to adapt to a greater, “European” mentality and to 
formulating policy on a much larger scale (97). On the one hand, experts argue 
that Austria is becoming “normal” and “Europeanized”; on the other hand, 
there are indications of resurgence in nationalism, fed by fears of lost identity 
and sovereignty. Väyrynen has suggested this aspect of evolution from a “na-
tion-state” mentality to a larger level is a response to increased ethnic conflict: 
As nations maneuver towards supra-national unions, devolution among pock-
ets of groups that feel their identities are threatened increases (15). This latent 
form of nationalism has at times, been equated with the peculiar manner in 
which the Austrian public has clung to neutrality, despite government efforts 
to abandon it. However, Gehler/Kaiser have suggested that the political elite in 
Austria had “internalized” the concept of neutrality to the point where the 
Austrian people now firmly believe the official position (98-99). Any attempts 
to change it would meet with angry voters. However, as Kingdon’s model will 
show, this is only part of the reason why neutrality has not been repealed. A 
clue to the rest of the answer was found by mapping out the rise and fall of   44 
neutrality on the national agenda from 1995 until 2005. In looking at those 
processes, as proposed by Kingdon, which promoted, constrained, and de-
moted neutrality on the national agenda, one begins to see patterns of 
￿avour￿￿r and recognizable motives for seemingly random events, espe-
cially within the area of Austrian national security and defense policy.  
VI.  Changes to the Security Environment: Setting the Agenda 
From 1995 to 1999, neutrality was largely considered a “frozen issue”, since 
the SPÖ-ÖVP coalition could not reach an agreement on Austria’s future 
within Europe and a common security and defense structure (Gehler 79-80). 
What little debate there was on neutrality was generally consigned to the im-
pact on military expenditures, which have consistently been held to below 1% 
of Austria’s GDP (BMLV Bericht). The failure of a governmental subcommit-
tee in 1996 to propose a revised security and defense in conjunction with EU 
expectations revealed the ideological differences between the People’s party 
and the Socialists with respect to neutrality (“Austria: Coalition”). By 1999, 
events in Yugoslavia, the Treaty of Amsterdam, and the success of the FPÖ in 
the 1999 elections revived the issue of support for the European Union’s 
CFSP and pushed neutrality back onto the agenda (Höll/Pollak/Puntscher-
Riekmann 19; Gehler 80-81). Neutrality has since remained on the national 
agenda at various levels; however, it is usually coupled with larger, more 
pressing policy problems, such as meeting the EU’s proposed “Headline Goal” 
as outlined in the EU’s Treaty of Amsterdam (1993) and subsequent agree-
ments (EU: Council “CFSP”). First and foremost has been the debate over 
what form the European Union’s security and defense structures will take and 
whether or not this is the best policy course for Austria. The spillover effect of 
policy from the economic sphere into the military sphere was not unantici-
pated; however, many of the new problems arising out of EU membership 
came from outside of Austria’s borders. 
Pelinka has suggested that Austria’s sudden push for membership in the EU 
had less to do with changes during the 1980s than from the sudden awareness 
that Austria was no longer an “island” (“Out” 36). Domestic problems that had 
been contained, but still unresolved since World War II, re-surfaced under 
new, external pressures, which had been largely ignored under Kreisky. These 
were manifested in the rise of anti-Semitism and anti-immigrant sentiments 
that began with the Waldheim affair resurfaced in the late 1990s with the rise 
of the FPÖ under Jörg Haider, although in the latter case, the situation was 
interpreted as voter dissatisfaction with consociationalism and the ability of 
the traditional parties to handle global change (Plasser 45).  
Going into treaty negotiations with the EU, Austria had still been consid-
ered to be “on the periphery of development”, having been situated on the 
eastern edge of the capitalist West (Pelinka “Out” 130). Over time, Austria’s   45
neutrality policy had not been able to overcome EEC administrative and trade 
barriers. “After a period of political stagnation within the Community in the 
1970s, the EC Commission suggested in 1985 the abolition of these non-tariff 
barriers and the creation of an internal market in goods, capital, services, and 
people by 1992. This initiative started a dynamic phase in European integra-
tion, which lasted until the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992” 
(Gehler/Kaiser 95). In the fall of 1991, the EC had already rejected EFTA re-
quests for additional concessions, effectively limiting trade and the power of 
the EFTA states (Missiroli “Austria” 15). “Representatives of the EC made it 
clear that participation in EC decisions about the internal market would be re-
served for full members” (Luif “Austrian” 27). Even though the EC needed 
Austria as a critical transit link between north and south, its members were not 
sure that they wanted to address the issue of neutrality, which would mean 
opening a discussion on long-term security plans (Missiroli “Austria” 14, 16). 
For Austria, it was either join the EU or face further economic discrimination 
(Missiroli “Austria” 14). “Business, government, and labor agreed that re-
maining outside the EC’s tariff barriers would place Austrian companies at a 
competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis firms in the Community and cost Austria 
exports and (over time) also investments” (Missiroli “Austria” 7). Neutrality 
would be small consolation for Austrians, if the country was once again crip-
pled by uncontrolled inflation, high levels of unemployment and general eco-
nomic and political chaos, as it had in the early twentieth century. While EU 
membership promised to bring greater economic and political stability, it also 
required that states surrender control over many areas of policy to the EU. 
It is therefore necessary to consider any debate on Austrian neutrality 
within the context of those larger security and defense issues, which also con-
front the European Union. This includes coordinating the national policies of 
25 member states, along with the proposed policies and structures of the 
CFSP/CSDP, the WEU, NATO, OSCE, and the UN. 
With approximately 453 million inhabitants and a GDP of over $11 billion, 
the EU-25 has become one of the largest economic powers on the planet 
(“European Voters”). It is only logical that some form of security arrangement 
would have to evolve from the economic and political union in order to protect 
the Union’s economic interests and its citizens. Austrian leaders probably 
knew they would eventually be asked to show solidarity by participation in the 
CFSP and an eventual defense structure. At the time Austria joined the EU in 
1995, however, these expectations were vague and still far enough into the 
future as to allow for possible concessions. Taking the initiative on how neu-
trality would be “re-contextualized” or re-conceptualized the Austrian gov-
ernment once again set out to reconcile neutrality with the changing security 
and defense environment. Varying degrees of compatibility with the WEU, 
OSCE, and NATO were studied; however, the element of uncertainty inherent   46 
in each, as well as growing political dissention between the SPÖ and ÖVP, 
seems to have led Austria to prefer a course of “wait and see”.  
The original intention of neutrality was to insure peace in Europe, stabilize 
Austria, and to re-establish Austrian independence, sovereignty, and territorial 
integrity. Seen in a prudential light, it was believed, these objectives could 
also be fulfilled as a member of the European Union (Schüssel).  
Dissention between the Social Partners began with the pressure to meet spe-
cific EU deadlines. The SPÖ, which in 1997 was led by Chancellor Viktor 
Klima, sought to maintain a neutral Austria within the EU. The ÖVP, on the 
other hand, was already proclaiming neutrality a relic of the Cold War and 
recommending full NATO membership if Austria wanted to avoid being an 
“island” again.  
In the late 1990s, the diverging positions of the Social Partners had trans-
lated into a haphazard approach to national security and defense resulting in 
federal laws that were incompatible. Much of the statutory conflict came from 
Austria’s legal process of incorporating treaties directly into its federal 
constitution (Hajnoczi 9). In order to resolve issues of compatibility between 
Art. J-4 of Maastricht, which outlined the objectives of the CFSP, and BGBl. 
211/1955, or Austria’s Neutralitätsgesetz, the Austrian government proposed 
an amendment to the federal constitution narrowing the scope of neutrality to 
accommodate certain types of joint military ventures (Hajnoczi 9). Article 
23f/1994 of the Austrian constitution indirectly adapted BGBL. 211/1955 to 
allow for EU membership and participation in the CFSP. Art. 23f was again 
altered in May 1999 to allow for “peacekeeping measures” in conjunction with 
the Petersberg Tasks and yet again in 2001 and 2002 narrowing the definition 
even further to allow for greater participation in “humanitarian peace opera-
tions” (Zemanek “Wie lange”). This has led policy experts and critics of the 
government to note that neutrality has been abandoned “scheibchenweise” or 
one piece at a time. Zemanek notes in his final analysis that all that is left of 
neutrality is a “Bündnisverbot” in the sense of a defense or military union 
(Zemanek “Wie lange”) and even that is under scrutiny as Austria negotiates 
the exact terms of the EU’s “Beistandspflichtklausl” or mutual assistance 
clause. 
The modifications to national law do not, however, release Austria from the 
continued burden of coordinating security and defense policy on four different 
levels: national, regional (EU), supranational (NATO), and international (UN). 
Although much of the shift in present defense policy began in 1989 when the 
Hungarians began to destroy their part of the Iron Curtain, real changes were 
not effected until 1995 when Austria joined the European Union. The most 
significant impact to security and defense, was the incorporation of “the ac-
quis” or complete body of EU law and rules directly into Austria’s own body 
of law” (Krüger 9-10). Even though the Austrian Parliament had added Art.   47
23f in 1994 to mitigate the impact of EU law on national law (Krüger 10), the 
approach was reactive and rather haphazard, and politicians have generally 
relied on constitutional law and policy experts to go back and clear up the con-
fusion whenever two or more laws conflict. Such has been the case with Aus-
trian neutrality and Austria’s own security and defense doctrine.  
The present doctrine, which was adopted in 2001 shifted the focus of secu-
rity away from Cold War policy to conflict management and re-defined Aus-
tria as “non-aligned” or “alliance free” (Chruschtschowa).
12 The 2001 revision 
still retained the original four objectives for Austria’s armed forces, as out-
lined under Kreisky, which were to defend Austria, to protect the constitution-
ally established institutions and the population’s democratic freedoms, to 
maintain order and security inside the country, and to render assistance in the 
case of natural disasters. However, the new doctrine also drastically restruc-
tured the armed forces and reduced troop totals from 300,000 to 120,000 at a 
time when Austria would be expected to contribute troops at the EU level 
(BMLV: Austria Armed”).  
An important example of conflicting law is found in BGBl. I-Nr. 57, from 
June 2000, which allowed Austrian troops to participate in various EU, OSCE, 
and UN actions as long as it did not violate neutrality (“Truppenaufenthaltsge-
setz”). The new law also allowed for the stationing of foreign troops on Aus-
trian soil, in so far as these did not involve weapons and were used for training 
or other diplomatic exchanges such as those required by NATO’s Partnership 
for Peace (PfP) program (“Truppenaufenthaltsgesetz”). To some critics, this 
law violates the basic tenants of Austria’s own neutrality clause, which stipu-
lates that, “Österreich wird zur Sicherung dieser Zwecke in aller Zukunft kei-
nen militärischen Bündnissen beitreten und die Errichtung militärischer Stütz-
punkte fremder Staaten auf seinem Gebiete nicht zulassen” (B-VG, BGBl 
1995/211 Art. 1(2)). To others, it has simply narrowed the definition, reducing 
it to the core elements of classical neutrality, where neutrality only applies to 
nations “outside” of the EU.  
This contradictory approach to foreign policy is due in large part to the 
schism between the two ruling parties over neutrality since 1995; but, it is also 
manifest in the disconnect between political leadership and the general public. 
While to some extent, this dissonance between public and governmental per-
ceptions has meant that neutrality has remained on the national agenda since 
Austria joined the EU, it has not guaranteed neutrality a prominent place. As 
Rathkolb pointed out, since 1990 neutrality has become more of a “domestic” 
issue than an international one, noting that the Austrians seem more concerned 
about defining neutrality than other nations (87). It must, however, be noted, 
that the domestic debate does not seem to be centered around neutrality per se, 
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but rather on the impact of economic, security, and defense matters on Aus-
tria’s neutral status.  
Although Austria may be committed to joint military ventures under the 
auspices of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, it 
still lacks the resources to follow through on these commitments (“NATO-
Standard”), which has meant that it must find alternate ways to ￿avour its ob-
ligations within the EU. At present, Austria’s leaders seem to be hedging their 
bets in two areas: by using the UN to legitimize the use of any military force 
and by forming a “neutral bloc” within the EU.  
The 1997 Treaty of Amsterdam, which had already adopted the WEU’s dif-
ferentiation between Article V and Non-article V actions relied on the fact that 
any proposed EU military action would probably be at the request of the UN 
and would include the support of NATO (EU: Council “CSDP”). Under Am-
sterdam, Non-article V military actions, which became known as the “Peters-
berg Tasks”, it became easier for neutral or non-aligned nations to participate 
in joint venture operations for humanitarian and peacekeeping; however, it 
also left many questions regarding the eventual shape of a European armed 
forces unanswered. The leap from crisis management and peace operations to 
a standing European armed forces where the security and defense of the part-
ners was mutually assured by a mutual assistance pact has not been made in 
large part due to disagreements by members over national budgets and the di-
vision of competencies. “[Critics] doubt that EU member states will be willing 
to make the hard political choices that could ultimately produce more “bang 
for the euro” because these could infringe on national sovereignty” (Ar-
chick/Gallis 16). 
Under the present wording of the CSDP, Austria could be obliged to come 
to the aid of another member state under attack, despite “opt out clauses” 
which could endanger the legitimacy of article 23f of the Austrian Constitu-
tion as well as the status of neutrality. Additionally, Austria’s two largest par-
ties, the SPÖ and ÖVP, continue to disagree about the level of military inte-
gration they are willing to assume under constitutional neutrality. Up until re-
cently, the ÖVP was committed to pursuing solidarity with the EU at the cost 
of neutrality; however, the stance has changed since 2003 (Austrian Parlia-
ment “Wie ist Solidarität”). The SPÖ, on the other hand, has made it clear that 
neutrality is not up for negotiation. They have sought to “re-contextualize” or 
“re-conceptualize” the clause, suggesting the use of “Beistandsmöglichkeit” 
instead of “Pflicht” (“EU-Beistand”). The EU, itself, has declared that mem-
bers are expected to show solidarity in any joint action; but are not compelled 
(EU: Council “CFSP”). The final proposed draft of the Constitution for 
Europe not only allows for a variety of responses; but, also various means of 
cooperation, including the possibility of abstaining from participation in joint 
actions where “national interests” are threatened (Archick “EU’s Constitution”   49
5).  
While EU security and defense objectives seek to develop a military struc-
ture apart from NATO, it is clear that the EU still relies on NATO for much of 
its security and defense (CFSP). This was made apparent in 1999 when NATO 
was called in to establish peace in Kosovo. Luif notes, “…that the Europeans 
were unable to act alone and heavily dependent on U.S. forces” (“Austria’s 
Permanent” 147). It has also been noted that most Europeans are loath to bear 
the costs of any standing military at the level necessary to insure the EU’s se-
curity and defense. “Die Europäer geben 60 Prozent von dem [Geld] aus, was 
die Amerikaner für die Verteidigung aufwenden, haben aber gerade zehn Pro-
zent ihrer Fähigkeiten” (“Die Neutraliät”). Therefore, the biggest issue facing 
Europe’s members at this time is what role, if any, NATO will play in the 
CFSP/CSDP. The link between NATO and the EU has added another dimen-
sion to the neutrality debate in Austria – the compatibility of neutrality with 
overt military organizations, such as NATO. 
Shortly after the events of September 11, 2001, the push by the ÖVP to join 
NATO intensified. NATO already manages many of the Petersberg Tasks 
where Austrian troops are stationed (“Die Neutralität”) and Austria joined 
NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) program February 10, 1995 shortly after 
joining the EU (Gehler 55). To some extent, Austria has already forged an ini-
tial link with a military alliance. The problem with Austria’s role in the PfP is 
that while Austria exerts no real influence (Gustenau 10); NATO has de-
manded concessions, such as over-flight permission, from its members (Sperl). 
This has meant revising the Austrian constitution.
13 It is interesting to see how 
Austria has linked its national security and defense policy, including any pro-
posed EU or NATO actions, to the United Nations, deferring to the UN as the 
final authority for the use of force. Luif has suggested that UN obligations 
have even taken precedent over Austria’s responsibilities as a neutral country 
(“Austrian” 24).
14  
Ultimately, by deferring military action to the United Nations, Austria 
would first be able to hide behind the mantel of the UN in cases where na-
tional interest, i.e. neutrality, is jeopardized. However, this tendency to subor-
dinate neutrality to UN mandates is based on the assumption that the UN will 
continue to define humanitarian and peacekeeping missions in the broadest 
possible sense and ultimately defend Austria’s neutral status. As Kunz pointed 
out, however, unconditional membership in the UN is also incompatible with 
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peacekeeping or humanitarian actions under the auspices of the UN. It has also been 
viewed as a rather one-sided relationship. 
14  This was demonstrated in both the 2001 Security Doctrine as well as in the 2004 pro-
posed draft of the Austrian constitution (Austrian Const. Convention “Bericht des Ö-
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neutrality (423). Krüger notes, that Austria has traditionally expected the 
United Nations to observe its commitment to neutrality and not request or re-
quire participation in Title VII actions. This, however, changed in 1991 with 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, where “humanitarian” obligations to the UN took 
precedent over neutrality (Krüger 9).
15  
Although Austria remains constitutionally neutral, the current Austrian 
leadership has defined its current security and defense policy stance as “non-
aligned” or “alliance free” instead of neutral. The other members of the Euro-
pean Union, as well as NATO, have sensed this indecisiveness and have even 
gone so far as to designate Austria, Sweden, Ireland and Finland as “former 
neutrals” or “post-neutrals”, preferring not to give them a neutral designation 
until a final status within the EU has been determined (Sloan; Gustenau 2). 
The ambiguity caused by Austria’s adherence to constitutional neutrality has 
remained unresolved, largely because of the formation of a neutral “bloc” 
within the EU by the so-called “post-neutrals” and the lack of concrete devel-
opments with the EU’s security and defense structures. In December 2003, 
Austria, Sweden, Ireland and Finland issued a joint letter rejecting aspects of 
the proposed CFSP as incompatible with their neutral status and suggested a 
revision be made to the proposed EU Constitutional Treaty to subsume any 
military action to the UN per article 51 of the UN charter (Missiroli “Confer-
ence” 437-438). While Austria and Sweden later went on to break ranks and 
accept what became known as the “Italian Compromise”, the message had al-
ready been sent: the neutral states within the EU were ready to band together 
to maintain neutrality (“2 States accept”). Gustenau notes that the biggest ad-
vantage to post-neutrals is the ability to advance their national policy agendas 
and effect outcomes within a supranational context; something traditional 
definitions of neutrality severely limited (11).  
The case for a neutral bloc within the EU has also been extended to propos-
als and theories allowing for participation in international “peacekeeping” 
missions (Pelinka “Out” 168: Gustenau 12). The distinction between “peace-
keeping” and “peace making” is an important one for Austria, since the latter 
implies a greater level of military participation. In 1999 in Helsinki, it was 
proposed that neutral nations could be allowed to provide civilian task forces 
                                           
15  “Since 1960, about 50,000 soldiers from Austrian Armed Forces have taken part in UN-
Authorised operations” (Hajnoczi 7). As of 2002, Austria had just over 900 troops under 
UN auspices stationed abroad. In many respects, these troops symbolize Austrian am-
bivalence towards neutrality policy in the new security environment. On the one hand, 
the fact that Austria has contributed troops to any military venture seems at odds with 
Cold War interpretations of neutrality; yet, on the other hand, the total number of Aus-
trian troops abroad is but a “token” show of support and cannot in all honesty be con-
strued as a military presence or threat. Another sign of Austrian ambivalence towards 
neutrality has been the self-imposed, revised designation of “non-aligned” instead of 
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in lieu of armed forces; making the transition from neutral to “non-aligned” or 
“post-neutral” easier to sell back home to the constituency (Steyerer). By fo-
cusing on peaceful initiatives, including police actions, with the potential for a 
constructive opt out on a case-by-case basis; neutral EU countries with limited 
military resources would be able to participate in EU missions without directly 
jeopardizing neutrality (Havel; Gustenau 8-9). The EU’s neutral bloc would be 
further enhanced by the presence of the Swiss, should they eventually decide 
to join the EU.  
While Europe’s “post-neutrals” are already forming a “bloc” within the EU, 
as is evidenced by a December 3, 2003 letter requesting changes to Article 
40/7 of the EU’s proposed constitution (“Analyse”); such a bloc would be 
counterbalanced by what some call an “exclusive defense club” of those 
“core” EU countries, such as Britain, France, Germany, and Italy, with the 
means to dictate or develop military policy (“Verfassung”). This could once 
again put Austria in the minority and on the periphery of European develop-
ment and power – a status the Austrians have fought to avoid for centuries.  
Ultimately, Austria alone must decide what constitutes a violation of its 
neutrality and what risks it will assume in any security and defense action. Ob-
taining international approval or legitimacy for any action in the present secu-
rity environment may actually be easier for Austria to accomplish, than obtain-
ing approval for any inaction under the pretext of neutrality. A precedent was 
set, however, in the early 1990s, when the Danish were given the opportunity 
to “opt out” of the EURO zone and the CFSP after rejecting Maastricht in a 
popular referendum (Lahodynsky). Based on this, Austria has continued to 
push for exemptions or special status to allow for continued neutrality within 
the EU. In addition to a new “exit clause”, the proposed EU constitution in-
cluded additional safeguards to neutral nations. “Language in the “mutual as-
sistance clause” and on “structured cooperation” in defense was also report-
edly modified to satisfy UK concerns that neither provision weaken the trans-
atlantic link, and to guarantee Austria, Ireland, Finland, and Sweden that EU 
efforts to forge a more common defense would not compromise their neutral-
ity policies” (Archick “The European Union’s Constitution” 5).  
Still, perceived problems with neutrality do not lie with the EU. They are 
domestic and lie in the struggle between the Austrian government’s desire for 
greater flexibility in the field of foreign policy, the overwhelming need for 
domestic peace and stability and the Austrian people’s conviction that neutral-
ity is a solution to the loss of sovereignty and a distinct national identity in the 
face of EU integration. This, more than anything, has resulted in the inability 
of other nations to clearly determine Austria’s foreign policy stance with re-
spect to national, regional, and international security and defense. 
While unlikely, it is not inconceivable that Austria could exercise its right 
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pean Union. The EU constitutional treaty has even proposed a new “exit 
clause” to allow member states to withdraw from the union voluntarily (Ar-
chick “European Union’s Constitution” 5); however, the conditions under 
which Austria might withdraw from the EU at this point can only be consid-
ered speculation. Still, there have been recent indications that some political 
elements in Austria wouldn’t mind seeing that happen and are actively trying 
to open a policy window with the fate of neutrality, Austrian identity and EU 
membership hanging in the balance. At this point, I must rely on Kingdon’s 
model to help identify and analyze those participants and policy processes in 
Austria that are presently affecting neutrality and the national agenda and es-
tablish why they are proving to be significant to Austria’s future within the 
EU. 
VI.  Neutrality and the Governmental Agenda 
Due to the complex nature of neutrality, it is often difficult to separate a prob-
lem from the condition. If, as many policy experts assert, a problem exists 
with Austrian neutrality, then Kingdon’s model will shed new light on the di-
mensions of the problem. Even if the final analysis shows that a policy win-
dow has not opened, Kingdon’s model will still help explain why no real ac-
tion has been taken to repeal constitutional neutrality. This will inevitably 
bring us closer to understanding those processes in Austria that develop or 
constrain national policy.  
The historical context of Austrian neutrality plays a significant role in how 
both neutrality law and policy continue to be managed. Designed to promote 
stability in Europe, while re-establishing Austrian sovereignty and independ-
ence, it did come at the cost of potential economic and social isolation. While 
these were mitigated by UN membership in 1955, these negative associations 
were gradually replaced by newly constructed “positive” ones by the end of 
the Kreisky era in the form of policy initiatives, such as “ die Brückefunktion”, 
“the Austrian Way” and other metaphors, such as “Insel der Seligen” that 
evolved to reinforce neutrality as an inherent part of Austrian national identity.  
Ultimately, however, these images were challenged as external pressures 
from globalization in the mid-1980s meant any form of isolation could be 
devastating to Austria’s economy. Lantis/Queen were able to demonstrate, 
with the use of their “dual diplomacy model” that Austrian scholars and the 
Social Partnership were able to “re-contextualize” neutrality to accommodate 
membership in the EU at a time when there existed great uncertainty with re-
spect to regional security and defense, while the Austrian people were still 
clinging tenaciously to a national image created around constitutional neutral-
ity. The successful 1994 referendum, however, was short-lived and resulted in 
voter backlash, which revealed a disconnect between the Austrian people and 
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Pelinka, Gehler/Kaiser, Plasser, et al have shown that since 1986, Austria is 
evolving into a “normal”, westernized democracy, shedding many aspects of 
Lijphart’s “consociationalism”, which can be seen in the rise of a true plural-
istic party system, with greater and more direct voter participation as well as 
increased demands for governmental accountability. This pace of change has 
been accelerated since 1996 according to Höll/Pollak/Puntscher-Riekmann, 
who have studied the effects of EU integration on the various institutional and 
structural aspects of the Austrian government and law-making processes. The 
result has been even greater discord among the various political parties and 
institutions, as each vies with the others for a greater share of political power. 
It is, therefore, not unexpected that changes to Austria’s security and defense 
environment have been considered “haphazard” and “sporadic”, often more a 
response to perceived crisis than any real effort to anticipate future needs. This 
also explains why there continues to be a domestic debate about the future role 
of Austrian constitutional neutrality. 
Ironically, recent debates over neutrality have taken place at a time when 
Austria is celebrating anniversaries that in many respects are representative of 
two diverging identities. The year 2005 has been officially designated the Ju-
bilee celebration of Austrian identity (Morak “Jubiläumsjahr”). In addition to 
the 60
th anniversary of the Second Republic, Austrians celebrated any and all 
anniversaries that have contributed to the post-war construction of present day 
Austria.
16 This included ten years as a member of the EU.  
The link between past achievement and future objectives is perhaps best 
summarized in an editorial comment by Austrian State Secretary for Arts and 
the Media, Franz Morak: “2005 wird Österreich erstmals diese großen Jah-
restage seiner jüngeren Geschichte nicht mehr in einer Randlage, sondern im 
Herzen eines größer gewordenen Europas feiern. Das ist kein Anlass zu einem 
nostalgischen Blick zurück, sondern eine einmalige Chance, das österreichi-
sche Bewusstsein in einem erweiterten Europa zu definieren. Das Jubiläums-
jahr 2005 bietet Gelegenheit, aus dem Wissen und dem Bewusstsein um unse-
re Vergangenheit Perspektiven für die gemeinsame Gestaltung der Zukunft zu 
erarbeiten. Darin liegt die große Herausforderung des vor uns liegenden Jubi-
läums” (Morak “Jubiläumsjahr 2005). State Secretary Morak has noted that 
the inclusion of the EU anniversary is an attempt to create a “larger” Austro-
European identity instead of a state-centered identity. The question has been, 
however, what role neutrality will play in this larger Identitätskonzept.  
The irony in celebrating constitutional neutrality while at the same time 
lauding membership in the very organization that threatens the foundations of 
                                           
16  The 2005 Jubilee celebrations also recognized the 50
th anniversaries of the State Treaty 
and resulting independence, UN membership, the founding of the Austrian military, the 
re-opening of the Vienna Burgtheater and State Opera, as well as 60 years of the Aus-
trian Workers Union (“Jubiläumsjahr 2005”).   54 
neutrality can only be understood against the backdrop of neutrality as an 
identity construct. Yet, it is the underlying use of neutrality by the various po-
litical parties to manipulate the public for various reasons, which is truly at the 
heart of these celebrations. Amidst various state sponsored activities and ex-
hibits, the Austrian government ratified the proposed EU constitutional treaty 
on May 11, 2005 while still in the process of revising the federal constitution 
(Austrian Parliament “Chronologie”). The debate on both constitutions has 
included deliberations on what role, if any, neutrality will play in the future; 
yet, this has set the stage for the present coalition government, which has al-
ready gone on record in the past against neutrality, to repeal constitutional 
neutrality or even to force a withdrawal from the European Union.  
At the start of 2005, conditions appeared ￿avour￿￿r￿ to change: the Aus-
trian constitutional convention identified a problem with the Neutralitätsgesetz 
and Art. 23f of the current Austrian constitution, which allowed for deploy-
ment of Austrian troops under the auspices of either the EU or NATO with a 
UN mandate. An available policy alternative, full participation in the EU sub-
ordinating any action to the UN with possible “opt out” clauses, was in place. 
Political conditions seemed right for change, in that the current ÖVP-FPÖ 
government, which had previously and very publicly called for a repeal of 
neutrality, has been handed the opportunity to do so quietly while “revising” 
the present Austrian constitution.  
However, appearances may be deceiving. Distinguishing between a condi-
tion and a problem can be tricky, given the importance of perception in the 
process of defining a problem. In the case of Austria, neutrality may not be the 
problem at all. Kingdon suggests that the appearance of certain mechanisms 
within the problem stream, contribute to the prominence of a problem, in this 
case neutrality, on the agenda (113). These mechanisms can be either routine 
statistical monitoring or “indicators” to the more sporadic events, such as a 
sudden crisis or disaster. The increase in number and severity of these mecha-
nisms also increase the likelihood of a condition becoming diagnosed or per-
ceived as a “problem” (Kingdon 113). With this in mind, I would like to see 
whether or not neutrality has been accurately identified as a problem, and if 
so, who is driving the push to identify neutrality as a problem and what criteria 
have been used.  
VI.  The Problem Stream: Identifying the Problem 
Has a problem with neutrality been identified? How has the problem been de-
fined? Who is promoting neutrality as a problem? The answer to these ques-
tions is key to deciding if neutrality is really on the governmental agenda. Part 
of the process of identifying a problem comes from recognizing specific ways 
in which a condition becomes a problem.  
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the standard for determining how neutrality and any problems associated with 
neutrality would be defined. As tensions eased in the late 1960s and early 
1970s with détente, so did perceptions of neutrality. With the fall of Commu-
nism, the success or failure of neutrality could no longer be measured against 
this standard. Although neutrality is still considered a successful foreign pol-
icy tool, its unbeaten record as a security and defense policy is suspect, having 
never actually been tested under conditions of war. Nor has political maneu-
verability with respect to economic policy and the pressures of globalization 
endeared it to Austrian business and industry. If anyone has considered the 
limits of neutrality a problem, it has been the VÖI and its political representa-
tive, the ÖVP.  
Falling back on classic definitions of neutrality and BGBl. 1955/211, pro-
ponents of neutrality have had to find another raison de être for neutrality or 
risk repeal as pressures from EU integration and globalization have made it 
harder to reconcile a neutral course within Europe. So far, they have been able 
to “re-contextualize” neutrality to their own advantage, placing neutrality in a 
new, post-Cold War context, while working out the details of how neutrality 
could function as a viable policy amidst EU military integration. Although 
this, in effect, re-affirmed a place for constitutional neutrality as a viable for-
eign policy in the new security and defense environment for the short term, it 
has not guaranteed that problems with neutrality policy could be avoided en-
tirely.  
While it is not the intent of this paper to argue the pros and cons of neutral-
ity, it is important to understand both sides and how they are driving or inhib-
iting the definition neutrality as a problem. Critics of the present Austrian 
government, who were also outspoken opponents of the SPÖ-ÖVP grand coa-
lition at the time of EU ascension in 1994-1995, have re-emerged in 2005 to 
accuse leadership of getting rid of neutrality in small pieces or “scheibchen-
weise” and suggesting that a final decision on the status of neutrality should be 
made in a public referendum (Austrian Parliament “Wie ist Solidarität”, “Gor-
bach für Volksabstimmung”). Even though Kingdon deals with the policy the-
ory of “incrementalism”, or gradual policy change over longer periods of time 
(79), he argues that this only explains some aspects of policy formation, spe-
cifically alternative generation (82) and does not account for the sudden, 
overwhelming interest in a particular issue or problem that drives true policy 
change (80). However, the concept of incrementalism is important to under-
standing the process of “softening-up” and the present condition of neutrality 
policy. The softening-up process, while largely considered a mechanism in the 
political stream, is also detectable in the problem stream where policy entre-
preneurs are driving the need to have neutrality identified as a problem. Ex-
actly what their motives are, what methods they have used, and are continuing 
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present political situation in Austria, beginning with those mechanisms, which 
Kingdon suggests, help identify problems. 
Has the condition of neutrality really become a problem? It would depend 
upon the variables one uses in identifying the problem, including if one is fo-
cusing on neutrality law, neutrality policy or both. It also depends on how 
closely one associates neutrality law with national security and defense. For 
the purposes of this paper, it is assumed that neutrality law, which encom-
passes policy, is the potential problem, given the findings of the Austrian Con-
stitutional Convention and recent FPÖ and BZÖ public statements calling for 
a public referendum (Austrian Parliament “Wie ist Solidarität”). With respect 
to the dimension of security and defense, however, there is greater latitude for 
interpretation. With this in mind, an analysis of constitutional neutrality be-
ginning with Kingdon’s mechanisms in the problem stream, can begin. 
It was not until President Klestil suggested a problem with constitutional 
neutrality in his January 2004 New Year’s address that a fierce debate within 
the government took place. By asking for a discussion on the issue of EU 
“Beistandspflicht” without allowing nostalgia getting in the way, Klestil un-
leashed what could only be called a final debate on neutrality (“SP: Noch 
keine”). The proposed European Constitutional treaty, which would 
￿avour￿edly strengthen the EU in three main areas, including the CFSP, was 
once again raising concerns about compatibility of EU objectives with consti-
tutional neutrality (“Verfassung: Neue Kompetenzen”). Included in the pro-
posed EU constitution was a mutual assistance clause or “Beistandspflicht”, 
which has been the focus of recent debates with respect to Austrian security 
and defense. At the time, Klestil unleashed the neutrality debate, the status of 
constitutional neutrality, with respect to the EU could still be considered un-
certain. 
Neutrality had made it onto the governmental agenda, but in what form? 
Was there truly a problem with constitutional neutrality? Or did they problem 
lay somewhere else? Why was neutrality suddenly such a “hot topic”?  
VI.  Focusing Events, Crises, and Symbols 
Although Kingdon identifies three “tools” to help define a problem, not all 
need be present to elevate a condition to a problem on the agenda. With re-
spect to Kingdon’s model, there are no statistical indicators that suggest con-
stitutional neutrality is a problem. Reliable quantitative measurements of 
whether or not neutrality is performing to expectations simply do not exist. 
Even the role of popular opinion polls, while statistical in nature, generally 
cannot be considered a scientific measurement of policy performance. They 
can, however, provide feedback on the performance of existing policy. In the 
case of neutrality, public opinion remains overwhelmingly in ￿avour of con-
tinued neutrality. Polls can also provide insight into the impact of focusing   57
events or crises on a given policy. 
The terrorist attacks on the U.S. on September 11, 2001 once again elevated 
the issue of neutrality back onto the national agenda (Sperl). There existed the 
perception that Americans were not the only ones who were attacked on Sep-
tember 11, 2001 as fourteen Austrians were declared missing in the attacks on 
the World Trade Center (“14 Österreicher”). The attacks on the U.S. forced 
the Austrian government and even the political opposition to evaluate the like-
lihood of such an attack happening on Austrian soil and the nation’s ability to 
protect itself in the event that such an attack did happen. The most significant 
impact that 9/11 had on the neutrality debate was to the proposed draft of the 
national Security Doctrine, which had been caught up in debate. After Sep-
tember 11, it suddenly received broad support across party lines and was 
passed on (“Weitgehende Einigkeit”).  
Many Austrian politicians softened their position on neutrality and the strict 
interpretation of security and defense after the events of September 11 (Einem: 
NATO-Überflüge”). If anything, the events of September 11, 2001 affected 
perceptions of air security and renewed calls for cooperative defense that ex-
tended beyond national borders (“Überwachung”). In response to the terrorist 
attacks, the Austrian government gave permission for NATO to use Austrian 
airspace, something it had refused to allow during the Kosovo crisis just two 
years earlier (“NATO-Bomber”). The ensuing U.S. war in Iraq brought home 
the possibility of the proposed EU’s mutual assistance clause invariably pull-
ing Austria into unwanted conflict. 
In 2003, proposed revisions to Austria’s own constitution amid the devel-
opment of a European Constitution helped to focus national attention on the 
related issues of neutrality, security, and defense policy. According to an EU 
Business online article from December 10, 2003, it was suggested that the 
EU’s proposed security and defense clause has “sparked a heated debate” over 
Austrian neutrality (“EU constitution leads”). The debate, however, did not 
accurately identify neutrality as a problem, since any debate on neutrality was 
invariably linked to debates on security and defense. 
Crises and focusing events alone are not enough to keep neutrality on the 
agenda. In order to keep neutrality on the agenda, it needs to be accompanied 
by “something else”, such as a reinforcing symbol or increased feedback. 
Even though neutrality has risen on the agenda during these crises and public 
attention was focused on the potential problems with security and defense, the 
common denominators among each has been a perceived failure of national 
security and defense and/or loss of national sovereignty in the course of EU 
integration, not necessary a failure of constitutional neutrality.  
Every time a problem with national security and defense has surfaced, it 
brought with it the inevitable debate about neutrality. It is this link, which has 
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gain legitimacy for constitutional neutrality while maintaining peace and sta-
bility at home. The link between neutrality and Austrian stability, peace, and 
prosperity has been symbolized in the year 2005. 
The year 2005 can also be considered a focusing event, in that it marks the 
golden anniversary of statehood, independence, the signing of the State 
Treaty, and the establishment of constitutional neutrality in addition to com-
memorating the end of World War II, the beginning of the Second Republic, 
and ten years as a member of the EU. Most importantly, 2005 is also being 
celebrated as the “year of Austrian identity” (“Staatsvertragsjubiläum”). It is 
therefore safe to say that 2005 celebrates what it means to be “Austrian”. 
It has been suggested by members of the opposition that despite outward 
appearances, Schüssel’s plan has been all along to soften-up the Austrian pub-
lic by shifting national identity away from its Cold War beginnings and re-
invent a new “Austro-European” identity without neutrality (Linsinger, Aus-
trian Parliament “Wie ist Solidarität”). This view has been reinforced by pub-
lic statements, in which Schüssel has suggested that Austrians look to the new 
Constitution for a “new” national identity, rather than to an identity created 
back in 1955 (“Staatsvertragsjubiläum”).  
The symbolic meaning of neutrality has not gone unnoticed by policy ex-
perts or academia (Pelinka 169). “Austrian neutrality must or at least can be 
seen as a concept of International Politics; as a set of rules in International 
Law; as an instrument to strengthen Austrian identity; as a possibility to avoid 
victimization; as a doctrine permitting pacifists to be pacifists without 
￿avour￿ing their pacifism; as a ‘double standard’ which allowed the country 
to be Western and non-Western at the same time; as an illusion to live on an 
island; as a possibility to mediate credibly international conflicts; as the poli-
tics of egotistical national cynicism” (Pelinka/Wodak 4). Liebhart’s study has 
also noted the “symbolic” importance of neutrality in establishing Austrian 
identity and the development of national consciousness (25).  
Still, it is perhaps the symbolic nature of neutrality as a source of independ-
ence and sovereignty, especially with respect to immigration and the EU that 
has had the greatest impact on neutrality and the agenda. The successes of the 
FPÖ in the 1999 elections were not entirely due to protest votes. EU policy 
has been and continues to be seen as a threat by some to Austrian security and 
Austrian culture, by forcing Austria to relinquish authority or control over its 
borders and concede power to other nations. As unemployment throughout 
Europe rises and immigration rates continue to hold, national sovereignty is 
becoming increasingly tied to the issue of neutrality, which is seen as a way to 
protect “Austrian” identity. 
Neutrality has been a symbol of peace, stability, and prosperity for so long 
that any threat to these cannot be blamed on the failure of neutrality, but on a 
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in other areas. Feedback on the success or failure of neutrality; however, is 
still linked to the EU’s CFSP and more recently, to the legal findings of Aus-
tria’s Constitutional Convention. 
VI.  Feedback 
In addition to using focusing events, crises, and symbols to identify problems, 
Kingdon also suggests the use of feedback, which is often informal and spo-
radic, such as letters to representatives in government or public meetings in a 
local town hall.  
With respect to Austrian neutrality, feedback has primarily come from two 
directions: The European Union’s CFSP (security & defense) and the Austrian 
Constitutional Conventions recent findings of a conflict between two Austrian 
laws, the Neutralitätsgesetzes and Art. 23f, which was passed to accommodate 
EU law.  
Kingdon identifies several ways in which feedback is used to identify prob-
lems: 1. Feedback on problems of implementation. 2. Feedback where legisla-
tive intent is not followed through or failure to meet stated goals indicates a 
problem. 3. Feedback where the cost of a program can indicate a problem, es-
pecially when dealing with projections. 4. Feedback on unanticipated 
￿avouquences of a policy (101-103). By looking at how feedback has affected 
the CFSP and the findings of the Constitutional convention, we can begin to 
see where a potential problem may lie. It must be noted, however, that with 
respect to Austrian neutrality, feedback is coming mainly from bureaucrats 
and experts on foreign and defense policy.  
It is with great diplomatic skill that Austria has been able to maintain its 
neutral status within the EU, given the objectives of the EU’s CSDP. The fact 
that Austria was able to gain concessions for neutrality from the EU not only 
in the Austrian Treaty of Ascension, but also in the recently proposed Treaty 
establishing a Constitution for Europe, has meant that Austria can continue to 
structure its security and defense policy around constitutional neutrality. It has 
not, however, taken neutrality off the agenda, if anything; it has meant greater 
prominence on the agenda at critical times.  
Shortly after Austria joined the European Union, problems of greater sig-
nificance seemed to replace neutrality on the Austrian national agenda. With 
the exception of conflict in Yugoslavia, the issue of neutrality was frozen from 
1995 to 1999 as Austria and the European Union worked out the economic 
problems of integration, including the EURO zone. At the time that the 
SPÖ/ÖVP government was considering EU membership, the SPÖ had done 
everything possible to minimize the importance of neutrality on the agenda 
(“SPOe-OeVP Dispute”). Conversely, the ÖVP did not want NATO member-
ship to become an issue prior to the 1999 elections fearing public backlash 
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ÖVP party platform statement, which publicly included the intent to seek full 
NATO membership. There was also unspoken fear in the SPÖ-ÖVP govern-
ment, in which any discussion of neutrality would lead to an unwanted deci-
sion on NATO (Winkler “Streit”). Now that the latest EU expansion (EU-25) 
has taken place and the EU is focusing on security and a European constitu-
tion, the dust has settled and Austria can now focus on what the full implica-
tions of EU membership will mean in the area of security and defense.  
Feedback in area of military preparedness and cooperation within the pa-
rameters of the EU’s CFSP has shown a direct link between matters of na-
tional security, defense, and constitutional neutrality. This is perhaps best ex-
emplified in the 1999 National Council elections, where overall dissatisfaction 
with the SPÖ-ÖVP coalition government came to a head, when both of the 
traditional parties lost significant votes to the far-right FPÖ. The 1999 elec-
tions spilled over into the problem stream when the far right, “nationalist” 
party, the FPÖ under Jörg Haider, succeeded in garnering 27% of the popular 
vote. Media coverage of the 1999 general elections showed that both neutral-
ity and NATO membership [security & defense] had became hot topics and 
that differences over these two issues are believed to have contributed to the 
collapse of the Social Partnership (“SPOe-OeVP Dispute”). While feedback 
from general population is that neutrality can be maintained within the EU’s 
CFSP (“Trotz EU-Heer”), experts regardless of position, anticipate that neu-
trality will eventually be abandoned.  
This may not be outside the realm of possibility, when one considers the 
constitutional challenges Austria faces, at the end of 2005. Due to the unusual 
scope of Art. 9 of the Austrian Federal Constitution, which automatically in-
corporates international laws and treaties signed by Austria back into the Aus-
trian constitution, a conflict between neutrality law, security, and defense has 
arisen (Seidl-Hohenveldern “Relation” 467, Krüger 9-10). Therein lies a po-
tential problem between neutrality and membership in the EU.  
Yet, problem recognition is not sufficient by itself to place an item on the 
agenda. “Getting people to see new problems, or to see old problems in one 
way rather than another, is a major conceptual and political accomplishment” 
(Kingdon 114). This seems to have been the government’s objective prior to 
the presidential elections in 2004. The ÖVP-FPÖ coalition, from 2000 to 2004 
was pursuing a course of NATO membership with eventual repeal of neutral-
ity. Feedback from negotiations on the 2001 Security and Defense Doctrine, as 
well as the Helsinki Headline Goals outlined in the EU’s CFSP showed that a 
potential problem existed with constitutional neutrality and Austrian security 
and defense policy. Even though security and defense had been constructed 
around constitutional neutrality, in the government’s haste to show solidarity 
with the EU, they were believed to be willing to sacrifice it in order to achieve 
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In 2003, Chancellor Schüssel called for a constitutional convention to revise 
the present Austrian constitution. The issue of “secondary duties” under the 
EU constitution has created problems for the EU’s neutrals, especially the ob-
ligation under Art. 23f, which would violate the neutrality clause requiring 
Austria not to undertake in peacetime any alliance or agreement that may 
compromise neutrality (Sucharipa 86).
17  
In summary, although a problem has been formally identified, the problem 
is not necessarily with constitutional neutrality; but with Art. 23f, which was 
considered an ad hoc response to the legal demands of Art. 9. It must be 
remembered at this point that Art. 23f was enacted in order to bring EU treaty 
law into line with Austria’s own constitutional laws. It is, therefore, also the 
potential source of a problem. 
VI.  The Policy Stream: Policy, Alternatives & Entrepreneurs 
According to Kingdon, the policy stream is much like a “policy primeval 
soup”, in that much of the basic material for formulating policy is present at 
the time a problem arises, it may simply be that the material has not had time 
to congeal into a viable or even intelligible policy solution (116-117). By us-
ing the analogy of biological “natural selection”, Kingdon is able to emphasize 
the seemingly random way in which policy alternatives are created (116-117). 
The survival of any proposed policy solution within the policy stream essen-
tially relies on the process of “trial and error”, often requiring years to produce 
results (117, 143). Proposals that have met the necessary criteria of technical 
feasibility, value acceptability, and anticipation of future constraints, generally 
end up on a “short list” of ideas, from which a final solution will be selected 
(143-144). 
In the case of Austria, a well-established policy community has been work-
ing on alternatives to neutrality for decades; however, their proposals have 
been tempered by the inability to accurately define the exact nature and prob-
lem of constitutional neutrality. Even as the Austrian Constitutional Conven-
tion began the task of revising the Austrian federal constitution, the challenges 
of accurately defining neutrality as a “problem” quickly became apparent 
(Austrian Const. Convention “Bericht des Ausschusses I”).  
VI.  Policy Community & Proposals 
The policy community, as Kingdon identifies it, is made up of specialists, such 
as policy experts, researchers, bureaucrats, academics, and interest groups, 
which in Austria can include anyone with the declared interest in policy 
                                           
17  Luif noted that Art. 23f made allowances for EU’s CFSP, thus opening a contradiction 
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change (116). These policy specialists create a pool of ideas that are ex-
changed both formally and informally, often working independently of the 
political stream. However, in Austria, this is not necessarily the case, since 
many members of the policy community are directly affiliated with one of 
Austria’s political parties as part of the “pre-parliamentary stage” of legisla-
tion (Pelinka “Out” 50-51). Because of its long-established history of conso-
ciationalism, Austria has a well-defined policy community adept at research-
ing, debating, evaluating, proposing alternatives, and formulating final policy 
proposals; however, this has not always guaranteed a faster response to prob-
lems.  
In Austria, the political parties are generally the source of agenda initiatives, 
and once a problem has been identified, locating or developing a policy solu-
tion is usually delegated to a lower-level bureaucrat within the related minis-
tries to draft proposed legislation (Pelinka “Out” 50).  
The cohesiveness of the policy community directly affects policy outcome. 
“Among the consequences of fragmentation [of a policy community] are dis-
jointed policy, lack of common orientations, and agenda instability” (Kingdon 
143). This is especially true with respect to constitutional neutrality, since dis-
sension within the policy community has led to a marked lack of policy alter-
natives.  
In March 2003, the Austrian policy community was given a mandate by 
Chancellor Schüssel, in which he outlined in a policy statement the govern-
ment’s objectives to revise the present Austrian constitution, which consists of 
over 1000 provisions (Schüssel, Austrian Convention “Tasks”).
18 Publicly, the 
objectives were to restructure the outdated and confusingly complex constitu-
tion making it more “citizen friendly” (Austrian Convention “Tasks”); how-
ever, it was understood that the sudden need to revise all of Austria’s laws was 
the direct result of the EU’s push to formulate its own constitution. On Janu-
ary 31, 2005, the Austrian convention submitted the final proposed draft to the 
federal government (Austrian Convention “Bericht des Österreich-Konvents”). 
The anticipated savings under the revised constitution was estimated at around 
€ 2 billion by simply streamlining governmental processes, eliminating redun-
dancies at the various levels, and clarifying the laws (“Convention on Austrian 
Constitution”). However, there were unanticipated side effects to the process.  
In general, a policy community largely addresses two issues: awareness of 
the problem and agreement on potential solutions (Kingdon 139). Failure to 
identify or address a problem, or to identify and agree on potential solutions, 
will weaken the policy stream and the potential for an issue to make it onto the 
                                           
18    The constitutional convention, established on June 30, 2003 with approximately 70 
members from the political and legal fields, as well as experts in various areas under the 
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agenda. Although a problem was identified with the Neutralitätsgesetz or con-
stitutional neutrality, the policy community seems hesitant to say outright that 
neutrality was the problem. Due to the fact that the convention reached deci-
sions by consensus rather than by that of a simple majority, various dissenting 
opinions had to be included in the final proposed draft, underscoring the frag-
mented nature of the Convention itself (“Österreich-Konvent: Neue Verfas-
sung”).  
VI.  Viable Alternatives 
The convention could have proposed a repeal of constitutional neutrality.
19 
Instead, they proposed that the National Council clarify this situation, before it 
becomes a problem. Their findings, or proposed “short list” of ideas, demon-
strates the difficulties of defining a problem. The proposed wording of the EU 
constitution
20, submitted in June 2004, would have required, at best, a 
￿avourcation of the Austrian constitution and, at worst, a repeal of neutrality 
(“EU-Beistand”).  
“Officially, Austrian neutrality has no obligation beyond the military as-
pects expressed in the Neutrality Act and in the rules of International Law” 
(Pelinka “Out” 158). This means reducing the context of neutrality to the basic 
tenets as outlined in the Hague conventions of 1907 – that of proclaiming 
one’s neutrality once war has been declared.  
In the Convention’s final proposal to the federal government, a lack of con-
sensus among the convention’s experts was noted in the form of three pro-
posed variations to the new constitution (Austrian Convention “Tonbandab-
schrift 8”). The first recommended wording offered by Mayer clearly sets UN 
and EU obligations before neutrality without advocating an outright repeal 
(Austrian Convention “Bericht des Österreich-Konvents”). The second pro-
posed wording offered by Specht calls for a “re-contextualization” of neutral-
ity forbidding “military” action, but allowing for economic and political 
￿avourity, reducing the previous interpretation to allow for EU membership 
in as far as it does not require Austria to abandon neutrality (Austrian Conven-
tion “Bericht des Österreich-Konvents”). The final variations, offered by Witt-
mann and Öhlinger argue no change to the present text of B-VG BGBl. 
1955/211 is needed at this time and that neutrality, in all its variations, should 
be adhered to over outside influences and seek clarification of the European 
Union’s intent to develop and enforce the CFSP/CSDP with respect to the 
“Beistandspflicht” or mutual assistance clause (Austrian Convention “Bericht 
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been repealed.( Austrian Convention Bericht des Österreich-Konvents).  
20  The EU treaty was ratified on 11 May 2005 and purportedly required no changes to con-
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des Österreich-Konvents”).  
In the final report to Parliament from January 31, 2005, the Austrian Con-
vention reaffirmed constitutional neutrality. Although no consensus was 
reached on the final wording of the law, the incompatibility of Art. 23f B-VG 
with BGBl. 211/1955 (Neutrality Law) was noted (Austrian Convention “Be-
richt des Österreich-Konvents”). The effects of this incompatibility have 
spilled over into other policy arenas and national defense, making it difficult 
to structure these. While on the one hand this presents a problem for the gov-
ernment, on the other hand, it is not uncommon for policy to be implemented 
without being fully realized.  
Otherwise, the only indication that there might be a problem with constitu-
tional neutrality is the final Convention report to Parliament on the incompati-
bility of B-VG Art. 23f with BGBl. 211/1955 (Austrian Convention “Ton-
bandschrift” 12). Has this been enough to elevate neutrality from a condition 
to a problem?  
Theo Öhlinger suggested in his position paper to the Austrian Convention 
that Austria could always fall back on Article II, Sect. 1 of the present EU 
constitution, which subsumes EU action to the UN. Under this argument, Aus-
tria could theoretically legitimize or withhold any action it deemed appropriate 
or incompatible with neutrality (Öhlinger). The “opt out” or escape clauses 
that the final EU Constitutional Treaty contained, would in theory make any 
repeal of neutrality unnecessary, if only for the immediate future.  
There was also a tendency among the Convention’s experts to defer military 
actions to the UN instead of the EU, once again affirming the Austrian ten-
dency to “protect” national sovereignty by requiring that any military action 
permitted under B-VG Art. 23f have UN backing. As long as an action is sanc-
tioned by the UN, Austria can participate as part of an EU contingent as a neu-
tral nation (Specht). Additionally, several policy experts were able to propose 
peaceful alternatives to military participation. Hämmerle suggests that Austria 
include a “peace service” along with military and civilian options. Suggesting 
that a peace corps could ￿avour mandated military service while promoting 
peaceful alternatives and improved standards of living abroad (“Hearing” 1-2).  
While Article 5 of the proposed EU Constitutional Treaty secures the right 
of an individual nation to refrain from common action when issues of national 
or cultural identity are threatened (Lanc 2), the EU’s Constitution hardly pro-
vides a viable alternative to constitutional neutrality. It has already been poin-
ted out that one of the three criteria for the success of a policy proposal is 
value acceptability (Kingdon 34). This is broadly interpreted to mean, accept-
ability within the parameters of the existing culture. Given the focusing events 
of 2005, one would expect Austria to redouble efforts to protect constitutional 
neutrality as a symbol of state sovereignty and national identity.  
While experts argue that any repeal of neutrality would have to pass a popu-  65
lar referendum, the impossible has been accomplished before. In 1994, the 
Austrian government managed to convince the Austrian people to ignore neu-
trality in lieu of economic gain. The earlier analysis of the EU application for 
membership using the findings of Lantis/Queen’s has shown how in 1987 a 
problem was recognized, a viable alternative was available and political condi-
tions were just right, so that a policy window opened in 1994.  
Unlike 1994, however, the policy community in 2005 has been divided, as 
are the two main political parties. With no consensus on either identifying 
neutrality as a problem or on finding alternatives to constitutional neutrality, 
there is little likelihood of neutrality staying on the governmental agenda. 
Are there viable alternatives to neutrality? Not at present. The EU has not 
adequately defined its political and military objectives and there is still no fi-
nal word on the role WEU or NATO will ultimately play. While the present 
EU constitution allows for “wiggle room”, Austria may still be confronted 
with a military situation where it will be asked to participate under the mutual 
assistance clause. Even assuming, Austria chooses to opt-out of a proposed 
joint military operation, it might still face less obvious forms of retaliation, 
such as the diplomatic sanctions it had in 2000.  
At present, there is no consensus within the policy community with respect 
to Austrian constitutional neutrality. There seems to be a general call to once 
again “re-contextualize” security and defense or find an alternate understand-
ing of neutrality in the constitutional convention’s position papers and final 
proposal rather than suggesting repeal.  
VI.  The Political Stream: Political Events 
The forces of national mood, including public opinion, and organized politics 
or interest groups, formulate patterns of support for and against neutrality. 
These forces, coupled with governmental phenomena such as “bureaucratic 
turf” and turnover of key personnel by elections, have a powerful effect on the 
agenda (Kingdon 145). Public mood or opinion in Austria, has historically 
been a constraint on any neutrality debate in Austria, given the public’s over-
whelming support of constitutional neutrality. It has also been used as the gen-
eral excuse for any policy inaction on the part of the Austrian government. 
After all, who would dare risk a voter backlash in an attempt to repeal neutral-
ity? But as we shall see, this is only part of the reason why a policy window 
did not open in 2005. 
Organized interest has also largely been disassociated from any change to 
neutrality, and given the balance between the interest groups and level of in-
terest “for” and “against” constitutional neutrality; their impact on the agenda 
can generally be considered a draw, neither significantly promoting or demot-
ing neutrality on the agenda for any length of time. It is, however, within the 
election processes that one begins to see where the agenda tends to be affected   66 
most.  
What is it exactly that is pushing neutrality onto the agenda? In applying 
Kingdon’s model, it has become apparent that the tension between a European 
identity and a national identity is perhaps the greatest influence on agenda 
status. The evolving European CFSP also still plays a residual role in deter-
mining neutrality’s place on the agenda, despite having reached a settlement in 
the proposed Constitutional Treaty. And finally, the shifting political plat-
forms or party manifests, as well as political maneuvering in anticipation of 
important political events in 2006 are also determining the prominence of neu-
trality on the Austrian agenda.  
“The political stream is an important promoter or inhibiter of high agenda 
status: All of the important actors in the system, not just the politicians, judge 
whether the balance of forces in the political stream favors action” (Kingdon 
163). This would explain, why it is neutrality has been on the agenda since 
1999, but has only risen whenever political conditions have favored a debate 
or possible change. This is especially true in Austria, where it is the federal 
government who predominantly controls the neutrality debate, determining 
when, where and if neutrality appears on the agenda.  
It has generally been assumed that in order for a repeal to stand a chance, 
Austria needs to have a government in power, which wants to repeal neutral-
ity. Historically, the Austrian People’s Party or ÖVP, with its close links to 
business and industry, has held this stance; however, this position changed in 
late 2004 with the election of a Socialist president. Kingdon has noted that “A 
change of administration is probably the most obvious window in a policy 
stream” (168). It is in the aftermath of governmental change that the potential 
for policy change is at its greatest, when new agendas and ideas are pushed by 
new faces (Kingdon 154).  
In Austria, there have recently been three significant elections where key 
policy entrepreneurs have either appeared or disappeared from the scene: The 
two National Council elections in 2000 and 2003, and the recent presidential 
election in 2004. The 2004 presidential election has been a key event in recent 
neutrality debates and clues to its importance in the policy stream can be seen 
in the sudden reversal of the ÖVP stance on NATO membership and neutral-
ity, as well as in the recent ￿avour￿￿r of the FPÖ and newly formed BZÖ 
parties who have repeatedly called for referenda on EU membership and neu-
trality.  
Still, the majority of Austrians continue to hold fast to neutrality, despite the 
unusual debate taking place within the government. This dissonance between 
government and public perceptions of neutrality can only be explained by ex-
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VI.  National Mood 
“People in and around government sense a national mood. They are comfort-
able discussing its content, and believe that they know when the mood shifts. 
The idea goes by different names – the national mood, the climate in the coun-
try, changes in public opinion, or broad social movements. But common to all 
of these labels is the notion that a rather large number of people out in the 
country are thinking along certain common lines that this national mood 
changes from one time to another in discernable ways, and that these changes 
in mood or climate have important impacts on policy agendas and policy out-
comes” (Kingdon 146).  
In the case of Austria, public mood or opinion has been consistently and 
overwhelmingly for constitutional neutrality; yet, it would be an 
￿avour￿￿r￿fycation of the situation to assume that public opinion is the 
only constraint on the neutrality debate. Or that neutrality is even the underly-
ing principle that is being protected. Public opinion would not be a factor in 
governmental decisions, were Austria not a democracy; and, therefore, subject 
to the checks and balances that all democracies place on their leaders. King-
don notes that the national mood, although hard to define, is taken very seri-
ously by decision makers, since it “…has important policy consequences. It 
has an impact on election results, on party fortunes, and on the receptivity of 
governmental decision makers to interest group lobbying” (Kingdon 149). 
Concisely, the general public has final policy authority.  
Yet, this also assumes that the public knows what is actually going on. Pe-
linka believes most Austrians still have not figured out the consequences of 
EU membership and the impact it has had on neutrality (“Out” 168). Since 
1955, neutrality has been a constraint on economic development. Because the 
government was unable to repeal permanent neutrality, they managed to rec-
oncile constitutional neutrality with EU membership; however, many policy 
experts believe this state of balance is temporary. Once the EU has achieved 
full political integration, it will then start increasing pressure to fully integrate 
its military. This would, in turn, require Austria to either re-negotiate conces-
sions, or face potentially damaging repercussions. Overall, there seems to be a 
disconnect between how the Austrian people perceive neutrality and how the 
Austrian government views neutrality. The government views neutrality as a 
problem; whereas, the public has been raised to view neutrality as a condition, 
if not a solution to foreign policy problems.  
Pelinka notes that Austrian voters are also holding the political parties more 
accountable, noting that they no longer accept governmental policy changes 
with blind acceptance (“Out” 35). Voters seem willing to demonstrate a 
greater degree of participation in the policy process and are quicker to demon-
strate displeasure for unpopular policy changes during the next elections.   68 
Although public referenda are guaranteed in the Austrian constitution, the 
present political structure does not encourage them (Gerlich 212). There is 
also the small detail of a referendum only being able to take place after legis-
lation has already been passed; thus, any general vote would be a “yes” or 
“no” to keeping the present wording of the law. Referenda do not allow for 
direct access to the policy process, nor is it generally considered to be in the 
interest of either those in power or in the opposition to call for a referendum, 
since this essentially hands the people direct access to the law making process 
(Pelinka “Out” 43); yet that is exactly what the FPÖ and BZÖ are trying to 
do
21.  
The recent rise of the Austrian far right started back in 1985, when then 
Austrian Minister of Defense, Friedhelm Frischenschlager officially greeted a 
repatriated Nazi war criminal. Waldheim, who was the ÖVP presidential can-
didate at the time, was caught up in the scandal (Rathkolb 86-87). Pelinka 
notes that the Waldheim affair not only brought out unresolved issues of the 
past, but it polarized the nation into apologizing for the past (“Out” 194-195). 
It also facilitated a political shift to the right, which brought about increased 
support for the FPÖ (Pick 163, Omestad). Those “patriots” or “nationalists” 
who felt there was no need to apologize for the Waldheim affair left the more 
moderate ÖVP for the unapologetic FPÖ (Plasser/Ulram 95). 
Pelinka has rationalized much of the shift to the right as a natural 
￿avour￿￿sion in Austria’s move to become a “normal” democracy (“Out” 
95-96) and has pointed to an overall trend in voter ￿avour￿￿r to reject tradi-
tional or established institutions and political parties (“Out” 82-83). While this 
has meant greater flexibility with respect to policy initiatives, it has also made 
the traditional parties more cautious with respect to promoting unpopular 
changes.  
The irony today is that some voters are pushing for change, while others are 
quick to chastise elected officials for “too much change”, which leads to insta-
bility and conflict (Sully Political 440). Neutrality, as noted earlier, has been a 
symbol of Austrian post-war stability and prosperity, and over the course of 
generations, has become a popular, if not integral, part of Austrian identity.
22 
Tálos/Horvath point out that for the longest time, stability and continuity were 
prized political conditions and in the past decades, these have changed (22).  
Gehmacher/Birk/Ogris suggest that the younger generation is not con-
                                           
21  So far, only one facultative referendum has been called, which was the 1978 bill regard-
ing the Zwentendorf atomic energy plant (Pelinka “Out” 42) and the last obligatory vote 
was the 1994 vote to join the EU (Tálos et al 9). 
22  “Postwar generations of school children had it drummed into them that neutrality was an 
indispensable element in their country’s constitution, and a clear majority of Austrians is 
regularly found to favor the continuance of neutrality when polled on the subject (Laho-
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strained by the past and feels secure in criticizing the political parties and gov-
ernment. They push for change, especially with respect to the Social Partner-
ship, rather than compromise and consensus (Gehmacher/Birk/Ogris 105). In a 
2001 U.S. report on Austria to Congress, it was noted that the tradition of con-
sociationalism and social partnership “…has come under criticism for slowing 
the pace of economic reforms” (U.S. Dept. of State: “Austria: Key Eco-
nomic”). Pelinka notes, the general perception among young Austrians is that 
Austria’s political parties are ill equipped to handle the problems and 
￿avouquences of globalization (“Out” 35). 
A “top-down” policy, in which the public entrusts their leaders to make the 
right decision is still very much in evidence in Austria; however, implicit or 
blind trust in leadership and the avoidance of confrontation and conflict in or-
der to maintain, albeit artificially, domestic peace and stability is no longer a 
hallmark of Austria’s political culture. The public is now quick to chastise any 
party in the next election for making unpopular or misguided policy changes. 
With the popular perception being firmly for constitutional neutrality, any 
Austrian government hoping to effect any changes to neutrality will have to 
proceed cautiously, gradually getting the public used to the notion of living 
without neutrality.  
Speculation as to why Austrians continue to “cling to neutrality” is varied, 
but most scholars believe it has resulted from the government’s re-
contextualization of the past coupled with the uncertainty of what membership 
in the EU will ultimately mean (Unterberger 73, Pelinka “Out” 169). Pelinka 
believes that most Austrians do not associate neutrality with foreign policy 
because the decision to join the EU was made by Austria’s political elites and 
they have never made the effort to disassociate identity from neutrality (“Out” 
169). Regardless of the reason why Austrians still feel bound to constitutional 
neutrality, there still seems to be a general attitude among the political leader-
ship in Austria, that the public is incapable of fully understanding the issues 
surrounding neutrality, due mainly to the spillover into other areas of Austrian 
policy, including security, defense, immigration, and economic policy.  
One of the larger issues to spillover into the neutrality debate since EU 
membership has been the influx of foreigners from the East and xenophobia. 
In a 20 September 2001 Krone poll “72 Prozent der Befragten verlangten eine 
schärfere Beobachtung von zugewanderten Ausländern, 57 Prozent waren da-
für, die Einwanderung aus Ländern außerhalb Europas zu beschränken” 
(“Großer Prozentsatz”). The events of September 11, 2001 in the U.S. only 
magnified the problem of xenophobia. They did not, however, translate into a 
decline in popularity for neutrality” (“Großer Prozentsatz”).  
Still, increased unhappiness with the EU’s immigration polies has had a di-
rect impact on Austrian perceptions of unemployment, economic stability, and 
issues of national security. Eurobarometer polls since the spring of 2003, have   70 
consistently shown the importance of unemployment to Austrians 
(Eurobarometers 59-63.4) . And, it was probably with great relief that the 
Austrian government has avoided political unrest like that in France in the 
wake of the ratification of the EU Constitutional Treaty. At the beginning of 
the new millennium, the FPÖ, considered a xenophobic, far right, nationalist 
party, was the second largest party in Austria and their percentage of the na-
tional vote went from 5% to 27% within 14 years (Pick 182). Haider had risen 
to power amidst voter dissatisfaction with the traditional parties and by 
exploiting unaddressed tensions between EU and national policy. While Aus-
tria has other pressure or interest groups, as we shall see, none of them has had 
the impact on the neutrality debate like Haider and his political party du jour.  
VI.  Pressure Groups 
Organized political forces, which include interest group pressure, political 
mobilization, and ￿avour￿￿r of political elites, are often perceived as having 
significant influence on the agenda, since their very nature is to lobby the gov-
ernment for change; however, their tendency to protect the status quo is often 
greater than their need to promote any real change (Kingdon 152). As with the 
policy community, if there is perceived consensus or conflict among the major 
interest groups, the government will generally conclude a balance of support 
for an issue and invariably nothing will happen (Kingdon 150). Kingdon also 
argues, “Once a governmental program is established, the clientele it benefits 
organizes into an impressive collection of interest groups….” These groups, 
seeking to protect the program, then “have a greater influence in any future 
changes the government makes and tend to reject future changes” (152). In the 
case of Austria, there seems to be a balance between those pushing for repeal 
and those seeking to maintain constitutional neutrality.  
Still there is the fact that organized interests sometimes have perceived rep-
resentation disproportional to their numbers. As in the case of the “squeaky 
wheel gets the grease”, the more vocal and persistent a group, the more likely 
their issues are to be heard above competing ones (Kingdon 150). Of those 
forces in Austria lobbying for change, perhaps the most vocal has been Jörg 
Haider backed first by the FPÖ and then by the newly formed BZÖ, which to 
varying degrees has been a vocal opponent of EU policy and its own coalition 
partner, the ÖVP.  
It is important to reiterate the fact that many of Austria’s political processes 
for creating policy are “extra-constitutional”, allowing for direct participation 
in the policy formation process by what would normally be considered “out-
side” or “informal” groups (Marchart). The uniquely Austrian construct of 
consociationalism, and residual elements of the social partnership have not 
only given the unions, chambers, and federations a more direct voice in the 
political process; but, they have also included the smaller parties represented   71
in parliament in the decision process. This has blurred the lines between what 
Kingdon has traditionally defined as participants “inside” and “outside” of 
government. The informal process of consensus building among all interested 
parties prior to the more formal process of proposing legislation minimizes the 
potential for governmental collapse, but it also limits the effectiveness of op-
position to introduce change. “Even major interest groups are controlled by 
the party – as posts are filled by proportion by party members. Traditionally 
certain chambers have gone to certain parties” (Pelinka “Out” 25-26).  
In Austria, the main interest groups are still represented by SPÖ and the 
ÖVP, the traditional milieu of labor and industry.
23 Additionally, there are the 
three large chamber organizations, the Chamber of Labor, the Chamber of 
Commerce, and the Chamber of Agriculture as well as several smaller, 
￿avour￿sional organizations (Pelinka “Out” 88). The result of this “all-
inclusive” attitude towards building consensus has meant that true democratic 
forms of opposition have never effectively evolved to challenge the establish-
ment.  
“Furthermore, in Austria, public discussion in the media is limited by the 
fact that not only the Austrian Broadcasting Company (ÖRF) is state-owned 
(considered a “public responsibility”), but also because the print media land-
scape consists partly of party newspapers (also subsidized) and independent 
newspapers that have been partially silenced by government subsidies to the 
press” (Wicha 358). 
While pressure groups and the opposition are given a voice in the decision 
process, many experts, like Pelinka, do not consider this the true voice of op-
position. However, as Pelinka has argued, this has changed.  
At present, neutrality is being pushed into the national debate by the FPÖ 
and BZÖ, who have accused the SPÖ and ÖVP of having already eliminated 
neutrality when they signed the EU treaty of ascension. The SPÖ, largely rep-
resented by Federal President Fischer, as well as the ÖVP, have denied the 
need for a referendum, arguing that there is no change to neutrality (“Es be-
steht”). By forcing a referendum on the EU constitutional treaty and thereby, 
neutrality, the FPÖ and their former party members in the BZÖ could either 
halt Austria’s efforts to further integrate its military resources or worse, force 
a withdrawal from the EU (“EU-Verfassung: Strache”; “Haider-Taktik”). 
While such a scenario is unlikely, the decades of Social Partnership between 
the SPÖ and ÖVP, which were spent avoiding conflict and instability, are re-
surfacing in both parties’ positions on a referendum and by the SPÖ’s lack of 
pursuit in a vote of no-confidence during the coalition crisis in April. 
An increasing number of legal experts note the dichotomy between neutral-
                                           
23  The Federation of Austrian Trade Unions (Österreichische Gewerkschafts Bund, ÖGB) 
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ity and the EU’s mutual assistance clause, making it mandatory for one nation 
to come to the assistance of another nation if it is threatened (Schnauder). The 
phrase, “solidarity with the EU, neutral to the rest of the world” is being used 
sarcastically to describe the Austrian government’s attitude towards neutrality 
policy. The present debate among experts and scholars seems to be reconciling 
neutrality with EU obligations, specifically in anticipating possible scenarios 
in which Austria would be expected to provide military support. Zemanek 
summarizes the Austrian position regarding neutrality: “Solange die inner-
staatliche Rechtslage adaptiert werden kann, ohne das Neutralitätsgesetz for-
mal anzutasten, scheinen die Entscheidungsorgane der Republik zu meinen, 
dass die Welt Österreich auch völkerrechtlich als dauernd neutralen Staat zu 
sehen habe – einfach, weil wir es sagen” (Zemanek “wie lange”). 
Austria’s newest party, the BZÖ was founded April 17, 2005 in Salzburg 
with Jörg Haider as the party chair and immediately set about differentiating 
itself from its former FPÖ parent party with some well-phrased rhetoric 
(“BZÖ-Gründungskonvent”). It is well known that Haider has been an outspo-
ken opponent of the two-party system in Austria; but his break with the FPÖ 
comes at an unusual time. The ensuing political excitement that resulted from 
the split of the junior coalition partner into the FPÖ and the BZÖ nearly 
caused the government to collapse, however, the extra-constitutional nature of 
the parties and formation of coalitions allowed for the BZÖ to step into office 
without the need for new elections. Essentially, the players remained the same; 
it was largely a name change. As for the BZÖ’s party platform, those political 
analysts who have been following Haider’s rhetoric and “populist” views do 
not consider the split to have changed either party’s true nature.  
The division of party funds and Bundesrat mandates led many from the 
SPÖ and Green party to call for a vote of no confidence in the government in 
May 2005, declaring the potential ÖVP-BZÖ-FPÖ coalition “arbeitsunfähig” 
(“Opposition will “Rücktritt””). However, in the interest of domestic peace 
and stability, Federal President, Heinz Fischer (SPÖ) came out in support of 
the re-organized government, which included the ÖVP-BZÖ with an agree-
ment from the FPÖ to support the government (“Schüssel & Haider”).  
The remaining FPÖ members elected Heinz-Christian Strache as party 
leader. “In der Erläuterung seines Leitantrags zum Parteitag hat Strache einen 
strammen Kurs in der Zuwandererpolitik vorgegeben: “Der Zuwanderungs-
stopp ist etwas, das notwendig ist, nichts Böses’” (“FPÖ-Parteitag”). This 
statement was purportedly followed by the sentiment that, “Diese Europäische 
Union ist nicht unsere Heimat” (“FPÖ-Parteitag”).This anti-immigration, na-
tionalist line comes in the face of yet another EU enlargement in 2007 of Ro-
mania and Bulgaria with the possibility of Turkey being admitted and is reit-
erated in the party’s program on their website under “dafür stehen wir” 
(www.fpoe.at). It was also noted in the April 23, 2005 press archive of the   73
party’s convention that the FPÖ present itself as “die Partei des Österreich-
patriotismus” in which neutrality was affirmed as a safeguard for Austrian cul-
ture and identity (“Parteitag: Bekenntnis zu Neutralität”). 
The impact of the FPÖ-BZÖ party split on neutrality has been a sudden 
change in the coalition government’s push to repeal neutrality and promote 
NATO membership. Even as the BZÖ is attempting to portray itself as a 
“moderate” or “center” party, openly agreeing with the ÖVP on continued 
neutrality, no NATO membership and a continued, although cautious, ap-
proach to the EU’s CFSP, its leaders have been calling for a popular referen-
dum to decide the fate of the EU Constitutional Treaty (Ettinger).  
The political upheaval would have meant the ÖVP would have to “circle the 
wagons” to protect and consolidate what support they could in light of the 
SPÖ presidential victory in April 25, 2004 (Statistik Austria: Statistisches 
Jahrbuch 2005 476). Even then, National Council elections are slated for the 
fall of 2006, shortly after Austria finishes its term as President of the EU
24. 
Even the Greens are against the need for a referendum (“Neutralität: BZÖ”). 
The role of popular initiatives in Austria is growing; however, they are still 
not seen as a reliable method for promoting one’s agenda (Pelinka “Out” 54-
55). Popular initiatives require the signatures of 100,000 eligible registered 
voters in order to make it onto a ballot.
25 However, Haider has been quick to 
realize referenda as a political tool in promoting his party’s agenda. 
Referenda, such as the Zwentendorf referendum and the 1994 Hainburg 
dam (Pelinka “Out” 24), or even the threat of one, such as the present situation 
with neutrality policy and the FPÖ after ratification of the EU’s Constitutional 
Treaty, can be powerful inhibitors of policy change. Although the EU referen-
dum passed, the general consensus by political observers was that the Austrian 
government did not entrust the Austrian people with all of the facts before 
pursuing membership. The threat of a referendum on neutrality, however, has 
kept the ÖVP from making any serious steps towards the repeal of neutrality.  
In the recent past, Haider has frequently pushed neutrality onto the agenda, 
either by referencing it directly or through debates on security and defense 
(“FPOe urges referendum”). In 2000, he gave an interview to Time Europe, in 
which he said, “You have no cold war, no Iron Curtain in Europe and this was 
the basis for our permanent neutrality. There is no function for neutrality now. 
But there is a need to develop a cooperative security system for Europe, to-
gether with the partners in the Atlantic partnership and that can only be 
NATO. That’s the only organization that really exists” (Leuker/Purvis). He 
                                           
24    Austria assumes the EU presidency at a critical time. Not only will the 2007-2013 
budget be on the agenda, but Austria will also be leading the sensitive re-negotiations of 
the failed Treaty on a Constitution for Europe (Schüssel).  
25  The last successful initiative was in 1969 and prior to that, only two others were passed 
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continues to be a policy entrepreneur, but his policy stance is unclear. 
“Haider’s positions with respect to the EU have undergone repeated change. 
Initially a supporter of Austrian membership – because he saw it as a way of 
moving closer to Germany – he opposed membership during the 1994 referen-
dum campaign to join the EC, he swiftly switched to endorse membership, but 
turned his guns against enlargement and against participation in the Euro-
zone” (Pick 185). Because of his rhetoric, some prefer to see Haider as noth-
ing but an opportunist and a populist, capitalizing on national sympathies to 
gain political advantages (Omestad).  
VI.  Election Results 
Events forming the third component of the political stream occur within gov-
ernment itself and include administrative changes, changes to congress, bu-
reaucratic agencies, and congressional committees (Kingdon 153). It is due, 
however, in large part to consociationalism that election turnover plays a 
greater role in elevating neutrality onto the agenda than in other processes. It 
is during major elections that neutrality becomes a “hot” topic. This would 
reinforce the belief that neutrality does not rise onto the agenda in response to 
a problem being recognized; but, because specific political parties or policy 
entrepreneurs view neutrality as a tool to promote other, related issues onto the 
agenda, or to garner public sympathy for their cause. Neutrality remains a po-
litical tool to manipulate political conditions, in as much as Austrian identity. 
This can be seen in the political maneuvering of the main political parties 
since 1995 and recent election results.  
During the 1980s, the ÖVP reinvented itself as a pan-European party, whe-
reas the SPÖ chose to focus more on domestic issues (Pelinka “Out” 36). In 
July of 1997, they took this a step further and adopted a new policy platform 
on Austrian security, which outlined conditions for full membership in NATO 
and the WEU. At the time, the ÖVP was the junior coalition partner to the 
SPÖ. The ÖVP’s push to join NATO only reinforced the image of the Grand 
Coalition (SPÖ/ÖVP) during the late 1990s as unresponsive to or incapable of 
dealing with the larger issues. At the time, the SPÖ chose to ignore the debate 
on neutrality in order to preserve the illusion of “social cohesion” (Glauber). 
“During the electoral campaign in the summer 1999 the (old) coalition 
partners gained profile through different positions regarding Austria’s 
neutrality: The SPÖ wanted to preserve it as a symbol of Austrian identity as 
well as an instrument of foreign policy focusing on peace without membership 
in a military alliance. The ÖVP opted for a policy which should lead Austria 
into NATO” (Pelinka/Wodak “Introduction” 2). The result was nothing short 
of a surprise. The SPÖ went into opposition, as the ÖVP formed a minority   75
coalition with the FPÖ.
 26 
In Austria policy can be initiated by either the Federal President, the Federal 
Government (Ministers led by the Chancellor), and the National Council; 
however, it is traditionally the prerogative of the Federal Government to set 
the agenda. It is because of this custom that the Chancellor is perceived as the 
stronger leader with respect to the Federal President.
 27  
With respect to constitutional power, however, it is the Federal President 
who formally exercises greater power, in that he is directly elected and is pre-
sumed to represent the majority opinion. While the Federal President in Aus-
tria has historically been above the political fray, there have been instances in 
the past, where “strong” federal presidents have sought to exert greater author-
ity in creating policy.  
Pelinka points out that one of the strongest Austrian presidents was Thomas 
Klestil (1992-2004; ÖVP), who deviated from many traditions and consoli-
dated his powers by insisting on exercising those powers granted by the con-
stitution and generally renounced by previous presidents (Pelinka “Out” 58-
59). Klestil’s focus on being a strong president led him to a second term in 
office and the ability to single-handedly raise the issue of neutrality onto the 
governmental agenda.  
In the late 1990s and early into the second millennium, Klestil repeatedly 
raised neutrality onto the national agenda, often using speeches given on the 
occasion of national holidays or interviews to spark debate. Zankel accuses 
Klestil of having introduced the most recent debate on neutrality in 2001 by 
suggesting it be repealed. “Es war Klestil, der die Lebenslüge Österreichs auf-
zeigte…verstieg sich Klestil zum Entsetzen vieler Parteifreunde zur ketzeri-
schen Idee, den Staatsvertrag und damit die Neutralität auf dem “Tabernakel 
der Geschichte” zu entsorgen” (Zankel). Klestil’s position seems have been 
one of closer EU ties in place of nationalism masquerading as neutrality. In his 
last address as president on January 1, 2004, he cautioned Austrians not to al-
low nostalgia for the past [neutrality] cloud judgment on Austria’s future 
within the EU (“Klestil: Abschied”). He added that sometimes one had to do 
unpopular but necessary things, once again suggesting that repealing neutrality 
would take courage. Klestil was noted for sparking debates on neutrality, hav-
ing maintained the People’s Party line in an office that was supposed to be 
“neutral”. “Klestil hatte seinerzeit während des Wahlkampfes für seine erste 
Amtsperiode gemeint, die Neutralität gehöre in den Tabernakel der Geschich-
te“ (Krawagna-Pfeifer). He personally demonstrated this by openly taking 
                                           
26  In a 1999 opinion poll, 68% responded that neutrality had been a campaign issue (“Poll: 
Majority believe”). 
27  The two main elections in Austria are those held for the Federal President and the Na-
tional Council. Both popular elections mirror the presidential and senatorial elections in 
the U.S. to some extent, but their divisions of powers are vastly different.    76 
sides on the issue of neutrality and pushing for constitutional repeal during his 
second term in office.  
Early in his presidency, Klestil strongly promoted the EU as an “opportu-
nity” and not an “obligation” in an effort to bring Austria out of the economic 
and political isolation of the previous decades (“Austria: Leaders”). Pelinka 
has identified Klestil as one of Austria’s strongest presidents based on his abil-
ity to build consensus (“Out” 58-59). As such, he would have been able to 
“soften up” the public while lobbying for support among other participants in 
the process. However, he died shortly before leaving office in July 2004 
(“Austrian Federal President”).  
In their capacity to address the public and sway public mood, both Thomas 
Klestil and his successor Heinz Fischer have spoken out on neutrality and each 
has held a different view on whether or not Austria should continue constitu-
tional neutrality.  
In contrast to Klestil, Heinz Fischer, as a member of the SPÖ has until re-
cently been a staunch supporter of constitutional neutrality. Since taking of-
fice, however, he has modified his position to allow for stronger EU ties and 
further integration insofar as it does not require “mandatory” participation in 
military operations. This is, perhaps, in keeping with a December 2003 inter-
view, in which as president of the National Council, Fischer outlined his posi-
tion on neutrality, the CFSP, and Austria’s military obligations. At the time, 
he deferred any final decision on neutrality until the EU could produce clearer 
guidelines for the CFSP and CSDP; and although, he did not rule out an even-
tual repeal of neutrality, he was still careful to tow SPÖ party lines (“Inter-
view: careful”). Later on, as a candidate for federal president in January 2004, 
he was quoted in die Presse as saying, “neutrality is not a religion and should 
not be laid out for the next thousand years” (“Fischer: Neutralität kein ‘re-
ligiöses Modell’”). Fischer added that neutrality was not compatible with the 
EU’s CFSP and that a referendum should decide the issue (“Fischer: Neu-
tralität kein‘religiöses Modell’”).  
Approximately one year later, after being elected president of the republic, 
he again reiterated his stance, demonstrating a willingness to compromise on 
neutrality by suggesting that it should no longer be considered “permanent” 
(Fischer: Neutralität “nicht immerwährend”). Still during the presidential cam-
paign, Fischer had made neutrality a major campaign issue by presenting him-
self as a defender of neutrality, and thus national identity, in contrast to ÖVP 
candidate, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, who had already gone on public record in 
￿avour of NATO membership and the abandonment of neutrality during her 
term as Foreign Minister under Chancellor Schüssel.
28 Despite Fischer’s own 
vague position, he was able to capitalize on the link between neutrality and 
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neutrality and national identity by exploiting Ferrero-Waldner’s focus on the 
external relations over national concerns. The 2004 presidential election did 
not raise the issue of neutrality as a problem, in so much as it promoted neu-
trality as a defensive tool against EU domination. The electoral loss of Fer-
rero-Waldner, as a key policy entrepreneur for the repeal of neutrality during 
the ’04 presidential election; also affected the ÖVP which revised its policy 
platform as a result. Conversely, the election of Fischer reinforced public 
commitment to neutrality.  
Perhaps the most significant change to the agenda occurred during the 2000 
and 2003 elections, where the ÖVP formed a minority coalition with the FPÖ. 
The shift to the right in Austria in early 2000 not only resulted in diplomatic 
sanctions by the EU; but also in increased talk of abandoning neutrality in fa-
vor of closer EU and NATO ties. Ironically, it is the left parties, the SPÖ and 
the Greens, who appear “nationalist” by seeking to preserve an “Austrian” 
identity, by reinforcing the link between neutrality and national identity.  
In 2000, Schüssel’s choice of coalition partner was a controversial move in 
large part because the FPÖ was considered by outsiders to be anti-Semitic, 
anti-immigration, anti-EU, and anti-establishment. Still, the results of the 
1999/2000 election could not be ignored. Haider’s party had garnered nearly 
27% of the popular vote, putting them 415 votes ahead of the ÖVP (Statistik 
Austria: “Bundespräsidentenwahl vom 25. April 2004”). Despite international 
outcry and diplomatic sanctions imposed by other EU nations in early 2000, 
the general consensus at the time was that had President Klestil not approved 
the coalition, the FPÖ might have gone on to gain even more seats in a follow-
up election (Omestad; “Europe, Austria, and Turkey”).  
The result of the February 28, 2003 election reaffirmed the Schüssel go-
vernment: “Die Österreichische Volkspartei verlor zwar 130.000 Stimmen, 
bleibt aber mit der Freiheitlichen Partei (FPÖ) gemessen an den Mandaten im 
Parlament gleichauf” (“Schüssel muss sich”). This not only seemed to rein-
force the government’s economic policies, but also its push to focus Austrian 
attention away from “Heimat Österreich” to “Heimat Europa”. The April 2004 
presidential election demonstrated that this was not the case. 
Heinz Fischer, SPÖ, was elected largely on the platform of continued neu-
trality against B. Ferrero-Waldner. He broke with the party’s practice of not 
discussing neutrality and pushed it back onto the agenda, after it became ap-
parent that the link between neutrality and national pride could be exploited to 
his advantage. Waldner had publicly proclaimed neutrality was outdated and 
Fischer, playing on this, elevated neutrality to greater prominence on the elec-
tion campaign (“SP-Schlusskundgebung”). When asked by die Presse, how 
each candidate thought they would spend their time in office: “Ferrero ließ 
sich sogar hinreißen zu sagen, daß sie 70 Prozent im Ausland sein werde. Fi-
scher sieht seinen Arbeitsauftrag genau das gegenteilig: “90 Prozent der Zeit   78 
muss sich der Bundespräsedent im Inland einsetzen’” (Die Kandidaten: Positi-
onen”). Another issue that may have affected voter ￿avour￿￿r was Jörg 
Haider’s public support of Ferrero-Waldner (“Wahlmotive: Neutralität”). 
While Fischer played the neutrality card, Ferrero-Waldner touted her interna-
tional experience, in which she perhaps misread the level of xenophobia and 
distrust of rapid EU integration (Kole). The initial  tally showed Fischer with 
52.41% of the vote and Ferrero-Waldner with 47.59% (“Austria: April 25, 
2004”). Neutrality was symptomatic of a much larger, more pressing issue, 
that of EU integration (Kole).  
What is the importance of Fischer’s victory? The final results of the election 
showed that Fischer received 52.39% of the popular vote, whereas Ferrero-
Waldner garnered 47.61% with 71.6% of the population turning out for the 
vote (BMI Bundespräsidentenwahl). While this is a clear victory, it is not an 
indication of overwhelming support for neutrality. To some extent, this could 
be seen as a sign that Austrian’s would like to see a balance of powers within 
the government. It might also be the result of increased fears due to economic 
change. Whatever the reason, the effect of the 2004 election has been to post-
pone any further discussions of neutrality. 
At present, it can be assumed that the political elite in Austria recognize the 
limitations of neutrality; however, their ongoing task is still to prepare the 
public for the possibility of change. While the logistical aspects of a repeal 
have not been worked out, it is clear that not only would the government need 
a two-thirds majority in parliament to repeal neutrality, but, also a national 
referendum (Winkler “Österreich”). Given the present political climate in Aus-
tria, the use of referenda or the threat of one as a political tool to keep the 
other parties in check, could lead to political instability. In analyzing the re-
sults of these three problem streams, it will become clear, why neutrality is 
still necessary. 
VI.  Coupling & the Policy Window 
It is difficult to remember that neutrality started out as a policy tool, meant to 
secure peace in Europe. Many people back in 1955 considered neutrality a 
means to an end. Neutrality was a response to ongoing allied occupation after 
WWII, the only viable option to regain independence and sovereignty while 
retaining territorial integrity. Today, it is still perceived as a “tool”, but in very 
different ways. Now, it is perceived as an “insurance policy” against EU 
dominance in matters related to national sovereignty, security and defense. It 
is also still considered a political tool, not only for “re-contextualizing” and 
maintaining Austrian identity; but, also as a check and balance between the 
Austrian political parties as they move from a two-party to a multi-party po-
litical democracy. 
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push to repeal neutrality is not coming from the EU, but from elements within 
the Austrian government, and even then, the motives of the FPÖ and BZÖ are 
suspect, since they have alternated between the positions of repealing neutral-
ity and retaining it. Luif has argued that neutrality is still important in domes-
tic politics, if only as a form of control for nationalist tendencies, especially in 
the case of Haider during the 1990 call to rebuff the EU and join NATO 
(“Austria’s permanent” 152).  
Erich Reiter, a former Austrian Ministry of Defense strategist explained the 
dichotomy between neutrality and solidarity with the EU: If Austria pursues 
neutrality over EU expectations, it will be seen as “nationalistic”; yet, if it ac-
tively pursues solidarity, neutrality will no longer exist and Austria risks los-
ing face (Neuwirth). 
Is there really a problem with constitutional neutrality or is neutrality sim-
ply a convenient disguise for some other problem? It would depend on one’s 
perception. While there have been focusing events and crises which have cre-
ated public awareness of neutrality, there has been little discussion of it being 
an actual problem. Even given the findings of the Austrian Constitutional 
Convention, there was a marked lack of consensus on a final draft and ulti-
mately no conclusion was reached. In a sense, the policy and political commu-
nities have remained largely untouched by events in the problem stream.  
At present, neutrality can only be considered a problem in so far as it is a 
constraint on the Austrian government’s ability to maneuver within the EU. 
Previously, calls to repeal neutrality have come largely from the Foreign and 
Defense Ministries where policy formulation is severely limited by constitu-
tional neutrality. Since 2003, however, calls to repeal, or at the very least mod-
ify, constitutional neutrality have also come from within Austria’s policy com-
munity.  
January 2001, Defense Minister Herbert Scheibner accused Chancellor 
Schüssel of unleashing an “unnecessary” debate about neutrality just as the 
federal government began work on a new Austrian Security and Defense Doc-
trine (Winkler “Österreich”). The proposed document, which was delivered to 
parliament in January 2001, noted the conflict between neutrality and the need 
for a show of solidarity within the EU. It underlined the need for legitimacy 
for any military action, by requiring a UN mandate before Austrian troops 
could be sent abroad. The debate on the proposed security and defense doc-
trine ensured that neutrality would be on the governmental agenda, at least in 
some form for most of 2001.  
On October 26, 2001, on the occasion of the Austrian National Holiday, 
Schüssel raised neutrality higher on the agenda by reiterating the need for Eu-
ropean solidarity without reservation during a televised press hour (“Haider 
fördert”). At the time, it was well known that Schüssel believed neutrality to 
be obsolete and had publicly supported Austrian membership in NATO   80 
(“Schüssel muss sich”). In a controversial TV address, the Austrian chancellor 
reiterated the importance of neutrality and its place within the EU. The con-
troversy regarding the televised speech centered on the fact that televised na-
tional addresses were traditionally the prerogative of the Federal President, 
who was supposed to be above party concerns. Schüssel’s four-minute speech 
linked those freedoms gained by the State Treaty with the European Constitu-
tion, which called for continued integration within the parameters of neutrality 
(“Schüssel: Bekenntnis zu Neutralität”). Many Austrians, however, doubted 
the sincerity of Schüssel’s position, given his past record of pro-NATO and 
anti-neutrality statements (“Putin cool”).  
The message that Schüssel and the ÖVP have sent while in power has been 
mixed. On the one hand, they have a long history of pursuing NATO member-
ship at the cost to constitutional neutrality. On the other hand, the ÖVP has 
evidently found it in their interest to modify their party platform and in 2003, 
they proposed adherence to neutrality in addition to abandoning the push for 
NATO membership.  
Since assuming office in 2000, Schüssel has publicly modified his position 
to support continued constitutional neutrality, but still maintains that Austria 
should not underestimate the need for a show of solidarity. Schüssel’s sudden 
position change may actually have resulted more from his weakened position 
within the government and the ÖVP’s desire to recover lost votes in the 2006 
National Council elections, than from any change of heart regarding constitu-
tional neutrality.  
Trapped in a minority coalition, Schüssel’s government lacks the two-thirds 
majority vote in parliament to make any amendments to constitutional neutral-
ity. Additionally, he has also been recently handicapped by the May 2005 
splintering of the BZÖ from the junior FPÖ coalition partner. Although the 
government managed to stay in office, the political damage could be 
￿avour￿cant in the upcoming 2006 National Council elections. Even though 
both the FPÖ and BZÖ agreed to abide by the original coalition agreement, it 
is proving increasingly harder to maintain the alliance. Just as the ÖVP has 
resigned itself to continued neutrality within the EU – at least for now – both 
the former coalition partners, the FPÖ, as well as the current partner, the 
Bündnis Zukunft Österreich or (BZÖ) under Jörg Haider, have come out in 
￿avour of a popular referendum to decide whether Austria should stay neutral 
or continue its membership within the EU, and thus elevating neutrality onto 
the agenda just as the ÖVP would see it buried.  
Although Schüssel’s power to dictate the national agenda is only as strong 
as the parties within the National Council backing him and the support of any 
junior coalition partner; he does have the power to capture public interest and 
create consensus (Pelinka “Out” 60). In the case of Chancellor Schüssel, how-
ever, this has not been utilized to any great advantage. In a final assessment of   81
his chancellorship, it would appear that the limitations of his office have ex-
ceeded his ability to promote neutrality as an agenda item. While he has been 
able to spark debate on the topic, it often appears that he is alone in this pur-
suit, since the election of Fischer as federal president.  
Normally, the vice-chancellor is the highest-ranking party member from the 
junior coalition party. However, another unwritten political tradition was bro-
ken in 2000, when senior ranking FPÖ party member, Jörg Haider, was forced 
to concede the post to one of his party subordinates. At present, Hubert Gor-
bach (now BZÖ) serves as Vice-chancellor and has been a key participant in 
raising neutrality onto the agenda by recently calling for a referendum on neu-
trality (“Gorbach für Volksabstimmung”). In deviating from the ÖVP-FPÖ 
agreement, Gorbach has created problems for the ÖVP (“SPÖ: Aussagen”). In 
calling for a popular referendum to decide the fate of neutrality, the BZÖ ap-
pears to be reverting back to its pre-coalition position of forcing Austrians to 
decide which is more important, national identity symbolized by constitutional 
neutrality or the loss of sovereignty within a greater European order (“SPÖ: 
Aussagen”). Statements that neutrality should be legitimized by a popular ref-
erendum given the changes to the security environment and Austria’s com-
mitments to the EU ring hallow when they are coupled with calls to remain 
open-minded to possible “modifications”: “…angesichts des geänderten inter-
nationalen Umfelds ￿avo man sich nicht scheuen, über eine Modifizierung zu 
diskutieren” (“Gorbach für Volksabstimmung”).  
While Schüssel and the ÖVP seem to be resigned to the present policy 
course of continued neutrality that does not seem to be the case with Vice-
Chancellor Gorbach and the BZÖ. The present debate on constitutional neu-
trality within the Austrian government is coming largely from the far-right 
elements within the federal government. To a large extent, this undermines the 
validity of neutrality as an actual agenda item. Unfortunately, this tendency to 
see neutrality as a political tool instead of a policy is also seen in the legisla-
tive branch of the Austrian government, where the aspects of party politics and 
consociationalism still play a significant part in the legislative process. 
There is an important duality to Austrian culture that can be exploited by 
willing politicians. On the one hand, Austria is a federalist state, where the 
federal government has held tight control over many political processes in or-
der to maintain stability and prosperity. On the other hand, the resurgence of 
local identities centered around villages or counties (Gemeinde) has had a sig-
nificant effect in recent political events. It is the resurgence of regional identi-
ties in Austria that made it possible for Haider to emerge in late 1980s while 
promoting an agenda of “Austria First” and to become a political force in late 
1990s. The very nature in which Haider was able to garner power has sug-
gested a resurgence of nationalism to many outside observers; however, inter-
nally, this phenomenon is explained more by lack of voter alternatives at the   82 
federal level than any real resurgence of those forces which led Austria to two 
world wars.  
Haider has been able to capitalize on the threat of outside forces on local 
communities and regional identities. His rise to prominence from governor of 
Carinthia to a political force at the national level, yet well outside of the norms 
established by consociationalism, has reinforced Pelinka’s claims throughout 
Austria: Out of the shadow of the past, that Austria is becoming a “normal” 
democracy in the sense of other western democracies. 
It is perhaps Jörg Haider, who has single-handedly kept the debate on con-
stitutional neutrality open and going, having early on seen its potential as a 
political tool. He has frequently pushed neutrality onto the agenda, either by 
referencing it directly or indirectly, by debates on security and defense or the 
influx of foreigners (“FPOe Urges Referendum”). In his “Austria First” cam-
paign (Pelinka “Out” 55), he promoted the fear that the EU would open bor-
ders to foreign workers and immigrants ready to take advantage of Austria’s 
comprehensive social welfare system, thus destabilizing Austria’s economy 
(Leuker/Purvis). Neutrality, in this case, would protect Austria from EU poli-
cies that would open Austria’s back doors wide open to illegal immigration.  
The result of having the FPÖ as a coalition partner since 2000 has meant 
that in 2003, the ÖVP was obliged to back away from its push for NATO 
membership and a repeal of neutrality in order to avoid alienating their voter 
base further. The Austrian government has for the most part managed to keep 
Haider in check, while addressing the issues that brought the FPÖ to power.  
Given the proposed constitutional reforms in Austria, Haider’s powers to 
influence the federal agenda, even as governor of Carinthia, may increase as a 
result of the very institutions he has attacked. This could be one of the reasons, 
why the ÖVP has chosen to modify its position with respect to constitutional 
neutrality. The FPÖ-BZÖ push to have a popular referendum on the EU Con-
stitutional Treaty could seriously threaten domestic peace and stability, much 
as it has in France, by causing the debate to spill over into other areas, such as 
immigration, unemployment, and the Turkish application for EU membership.  
Right now, it is the ÖVP’s willingness to stand firm on constitutional neu-
trality that is keeping any potential referendum from happening. Traditionally 
viewed as an anti-neutrality party, the ÖVP now finds itself alongside the SPÖ 
protecting constitutional neutrality in order to prevent a referendum on the EU 
constitution. This would ensure domestic peace and stability at the cost of po-
litical maneuverability on the international scene. Many experts would argue 
that the purpose of neutrality has come full circle: to keep domestic conflict 
from spilling over into the international arena. 
The two reasons for why neutrality law has not yet been repealed are be-
cause parliament lacks the two-thirds majority needed to pass any measure 
(“Die Neutralität existiert”) and because public mood is still overwhelming for   83
continued neutrality. Phinnemore noted that in addition to public opinion be-
ing overwhelmingly in ￿avour of continued neutrality, an appropriate re-
placement of neutrality law has not been found (369). If neutrality were to be 
repealed, what foreign policy would the Austrian government replace it with; 
after all, the EU’s policies have not been sufficiently defined. But perhaps the 
biggest reason why neutrality has not been repealed is that it has not ade-
quately been identified as the problem.  
The final determination of the Austrian Convention was that it was not 
within the scope of power of the convention to delete, or, in any significant 
way, alter constitutional neutrality (Öhlinger). Legitimacy for such an act 
should remain either with Parliament or with the public through a referendum. 
Even then, the issue of what exactly Austrians would be voting on is up for 
debate.  
VI.  Summary & Conclusion 
The complex historical environment, in which constitutional law and policy 
were established, has at times made it difficult for outsiders to the policy proc-
ess to understand what forces are really affecting neutrality. While many of 
the Cold War constraints on neutrality disappeared with the fall of the Soviet 
Union, new ones have evolved to replace them. There is no discounting the 
fact that neutrality was originally considered a foreign policy tool, designed to 
minimize Austrian participation in future conflicts; however, it quickly evol-
ved into much more.  
By 1956, it was an integral part of Austrian security and defense policy, as 
well as an instrument for constructing a uniquely Austrian identity removed 
from a “Germanic” one. In addition to having restored independence and na-
tional sovereignty, neutrality also secured domestic stability in the form of 
Consociational Democracy. In the hands of Austria’s determined leadership, 
elements of consociationalism were adapted to form the Social Partnership, 
Corporatism, and Proporz, which created a unique form of “domestic neutral-
ity”, where conflict was to be avoided at all cost.  
It was not until Chancellor Kreisky that a golden era for neutrality was cre-
ated. Under Kreisky, the limits of neutrality were “re-contextualized” into the 
positive images of a “Brückefunktion”, an “Austrian Way” or “Third Way”, 
and an “Insel der Seligen”. Even though Kreisky could not claim all of the 
credit for establishing neutrality as a part of Austrian national identity, he did 
go a long way to promote these images abroad, and restore a sense of pride in 
what it meant to be Austrian. 
The carefully constructed images that had come to represent Kreisky’s Aus-
tria were soon shattered as the effects of globalization began to encroach on 
the small, alpine nation. Austria’s policy community set about once again to 
“re-contextualize” neutrality and the policy environment to permit member-  84 
ship in the European Union, a move that before 1989 would have been diffi-
cult at best, if not outright impossible. However, as Lantis/Queen have demon-
strated, with the use of their “Double-edge diplomacy model”, all of the condi-
tions were right for change at both the national and EU levels 
At the time Austria joined the European Union, on January 1, 1995, many 
policy experts believed that the Austrian government had not only relin-
quished total control over foreign policy, but that Austria was now committed 
to a military alliance (CFSP) that was in direct violation of constitutional neu-
trality. However, Austria was able to resolve this conflict on three fronts, first 
by forming a neutral bloc within the EU, then, by arguing for concessions, 
with respect to the Helsinki Headline Goal and the Mutual Assistance Clause, 
and, finally, Austria was able to “re-contextualize” its own policy environment 
to permit slight changes to its own laws. Art. 23f was added in anticipation of 
joint EU actions under a UN mandate.  
While any debate on Austrian foreign or security and defense policy inevi-
tably included discussions on neutrality, continued neutrality was never up for 
a repeal – that is until 2005. In 2003, the Austrian government, which had al-
ready gone on record with the intent to see Austria join NATO and repeal neu-
trality, announced the formation of a constitutional convention to “revise and 
renew” the confusingly complex constitution from 1921. It seemed that condi-
tions might be right for a window of opportunity.  
However, as Kingdon’s model has demonstrated, not only did a policy win-
dow fail to open, there was never any danger that one would. Constitutional 
neutrality has never been defined as a policy problem, although other, related 
areas, such as security and defense have. Although problems from security and 
defense have spilled over into the area of neutrality policy, neutrality law re-
mains simply a condition. Where focusing events have been able to elevate it 
into the debate, neutrality, itself, has never come up for a formal decision. 
Even assuming there was a problem with neutrality, the policy community has 
been unable to suggest viable policy alternatives to neutrality. European poli-
cies simply have not evolved sufficiently to replace national ones. Instead, the 
policy community has proposed slight modifications to the offending clauses 
and left a final decision for the Federal Government.  
It is perhaps in the political stream, however, that we see the greatest indica-
tion that neutrality has not really been on the agenda. The ÖVP, long believed 
to be neutrality’s biggest opponent, changed its positions on NATO member-
ship and neutrality shortly after the 2004 elections. While it would be easy to 
link this platform change to the need to reach votes for the upcoming 2006 
elections, this has been proven to be an oversimplification of what is really 
happening. In addition to the 2006 National Council elections, the ÖVP has 
also had to protect the status of the EU Constitutional Treaty.  
Trapped in a minority coalition with the newly formed BZÖ, Schüssel has   85
had very little power to accomplish realistic objectives, let alone pursue the 
repeal of neutrality. The result of having the FPÖ and BZÖ as coalition part-
ners since 2000 has meant that in 2004, the ÖVP was obliged to back away 
from its push for NATO membership and a repeal of neutrality in order to 
avoid alienating their voter base further.  
Most importantly, however, neutrality has once again become a tool for the 
government to maintain domestic and political stability. As the FPÖ and BZÖ 
have continued to push for a referendum on the EU Constitutional Treaty, they 
have set up an “either” “or” situation, where in calling for a popular vote on 
the EU treaty, they are once again raising the issue of national sovereignty in 
the face of EU domination.  
In conclusion, a window of opportunity could not have opened in 2005, 
since a problem with neutrality was never identified, no policy alternatives to 
neutrality exist and within the political stream, conditions were not receptive 
to change. Not only can it be said that national mood is against any change to 
constitutional neutrality; but, the main parties within the government were also 
against changes, since it would open up a level of political instability that has 
not been seen since before 1945.  
In effect, neutrality still retains the original purpose for which it was 
adopted – that of maintaining domestic stability, especially as Austria transi-
tions from a two-party, consociational democracy to a true, Western-
European, multi-party democracy. In this respect, neutrality has been an im-
portant and necessary tool for the political parties in controlling nationalist 
elements that might otherwise have caused greater conflict. 
Austria’s leadership has tended to view neutrality as a policy tool to be used 
or discarded as needed; whereas, the public has come to view neutrality as a 
way of life – a part of a unifying national identity (Pelinka “Austria’s Future” 
78). This dissonance between public and governmental perceptions of neutral-
ity has meant inaction. Reconciling the conflicting articles of the Austrian 
constitution is easier than convincing the Austrian people that their future does 
not require neutrality. It is also easier than allowing the system of consocia-
tionalism to collapse, when there is still the possibility that nationalist, far-
right elements could cause social unrest and even political instability. The fear 
of revisiting the past is still greater than the limits of neutrality.  
While there is no guarantee that the EU will eventually require Austria to 
formally abandon neutrality, the possibility always exists. Navigating the nu-
ances between “military” and “non-military” operations may prove tricky in 
the future; but therein lies Austria’s greatest strength – the ability to exhaust 
every possible option and negotiate with patience and persistence. 
Artificial political structures, which were designed to insure democracy af-
ter World War II may no be longer required to modernize Austria (Pelinka, 
“Out” 15). However, neutrality and its domestic equivalent, consociationalism,   86 
are still required to maintain political stability, if only for a while longer.  
In the final analysis, Kingdon’s model of agenda setting has demonstrated 
that Austrian neutrality was never in immediate danger of repeal and that it is 
probably quite safe to assume that a repeal of constitutional neutrality will not 
happen in the foreseeable future. At least, until the EU policy has achieved a 
level of legitimacy equivalent to neutrality.     
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